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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the employment and adherence of the 
intelligence cycle process model within the National Network of Fusion Centers and the 
greater Homeland Security Enterprise by exploring the customary intelligence cycle 
process model established by the United States Intelligence Community (USIC). This 
thesis revealed there are various intelligence cycle process models used by the USIC and 
taught to the National Network. Given the numerous different training entities and varied 
intelligence cycle process models, challenges exist with providing a well-defined training 
program that ensures consistent and clear intelligence cycle process model employment. 
Finally, this thesis offers an overview pertinent to researchers and/or practitioners 
regarding the viability of employing the intelligence cycle process model as the principle 
guide for domestic intelligence activities. 
This thesis employed a qualitative research method that analyzed and interpreted 
publicly available academic and policy information gathered from government and 
nongovernment institutions regarding the conceptual and practical intelligence cycle 
process model narratives. A case study analysis was conducted of the April 15, 2013, 
Boston Marathon bombing as a platform to discuss the active and effective employment 
of the intelligence cycle process model by the National Network.  
The principal conclusion offers while literature clearly agrees the intelligence 
cycle process model is a cyclical structure of actions, literature also finds there are 
common themes suggesting the intelligence cycle does not sufficiently describe how the 
intelligence process works at the operational stages of domestic intelligence activities 
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The United States Intelligence Community (USIC) was not designed to serve as a 
concept intended to detect significant national security threats originating or residing 
within our nation’s borders, but it was focused on foreign intelligence activities. Little 
research has been done to study the post-9/11 Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) 
counterterrorism efforts supporting domestic intelligence activities and its reliance on the 
intelligence cycle process model. This thesis evaluates whether the intelligence cycle 
process model supports the performance of domestic intelligence activities, specifically 
within the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network) and the greater HSE. 
The unprecedented September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks brought into question the 
USIC intelligence collection capabilities and served as the catalyst for state, local, tribal 
and private sector partners into the HSE. The DHS 2011 National Network of Fusion 
Centers Final Report defined the HSE as federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, 
and private sector entities. The HSE serves organized complex organizations and their 
relationships through the National Network. The National Network allows for the 
integration of the HSE as nontraditional intelligence entities employing intelligence 
collection and analysis. The National Network and broader HSE have become essential 
elements providing support to the national intelligence architecture. 
Originally, the 1947 USIC structure and the function of its intelligence cycle 
process model was designed to provide essential information to the president, 
policymakers, federal organizations, and military communities. The 1947 USIC structure 
has expanded to its current structure that includes 17 organizations charged with 
conducting intelligence activities – both foreign and domestic. Today, the growth of the 
USIC and its purpose has expanded beyond federal elements to include the National 




An assessment of the limited information made available that focuses on domestic 
intelligence and the intelligence cycle employment reveals information gaps concerning 
its effectiveness and appropriateness within the post-9/11 HSE. While literature clearly 
agrees the intelligence cycle process model is a cyclical structure of actions, literature 
also finds there are common themes suggesting the intelligence cycle does not 
sufficiently describe how the intelligence process works at the operational stages of 
domestic intelligence activities within the National Network. 
This thesis offers an overview pertinent to researchers and/or practitioners 
regarding the viability of employing the intelligence cycle process model as the principle 
guide for domestic intelligence collection activities. Intelligence derived from analyzed 
information through the intelligence cycle process serves as a principle tool for 
supporting the nation’s counterterrorism efforts and offers law enforcement and 
homeland security officials with insights and advantages over terrorists. However, there 
are multiple intelligence cycle concepts within the USIC and the HSE. The various 
intelligence cycle process models range from a four-step process to a seven-step process.  
There are various intelligence cycle process models used by the USIC and now 
being taught to the National Network by federally funded entities. As an example, the 
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the National Counterterrorism Center, 
the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), the Department of Justice 
State and Local Anti-terrorism Training Program, and the International Association of 
Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEA) each deliver intelligence training 
opportunities enthusiastic of the intelligence cycle process model. Given the number of 
different training entities and varied intelligence cycle process models, challenges exist 
with providing a well-defined training program that ensures consistent and clear 
intelligence cycle process model employment within the National Network.  
A case study analysis of the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing 
illuminates adherence to the intelligence cycle process model as a proactive approach that 
may have prevented the bombing. This case study was selected in an effort demonstrate 
the conceptual intelligence cycle process model, in action. Additionally, it  
 
 xvii 
offers the challenges with employing the intelligence cycle process model as an element 
of the 2003 National Criminal Information Sharing Plan (NCISP) in efforts to prevent 
terrorism.  
The literature provided no USIC or HSE doctrinal information on the adoption of 
the intelligence cycle as a formal process by USIC or HSE members. Providing 
comprehensive, consistent intelligence cycle process training to the National Network 
may serve to decrease privacy concerns while also verifying a concerted federal effort in 
the fitting execution of domestic intelligence activities. Drawing on publicly available 
information from government, academia, and national security consortiums, analysis 
revealed broad acceptance of the intelligence cycle process model philosophy. However, 
literature provided by academic and operational practitioners support claims that the 
intelligence cycle process model is flawed and not practical in the operational 
environment. This thesis may serve as a basis for recommending additional research 
necessary for studying the intelligence cycle process model implementation and 
employment within the post-9/11 HSE and its effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks 
and enhancing national security intelligence. 
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The topic discussed in this thesis is important to the author, and as such, presents 
a degree of theoretical sensitivities. This thesis runs the risk of slight bias towards the 
intelligence cycle process model from the federal level and national security intelligence 
perspective; juxtapose the nontraditional criminal intelligence perspective at the state and 
local level. The author’s own professional experiences as a retired intelligence collector 
with the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps/Defense Intelligence Agency, former 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Intelligence Analyst and current DHS Senior 
Intelligence Officer have been useful in understanding the policy and practical challenges 
related to employing the intelligence cycle process model. 
However, the intent of this research is to serve as an introduction and description 
of the issues necessary to explore employing the customary intelligence cycle process 
model established by the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) within the 
National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network) and the greater Homeland 
Security Enterprise (HSE). The information offered delivers an overview pertinent to 
researchers and/or practitioners regarding the viability of employing the intelligence 
cycle process model as the principle guide for domestic intelligence collection activities. 
On September 11, 2001, the unthinkable happened. International terrorists 
residing in the US brought into question the USIC intelligence collection capabilities and 
served as the catalyst for state, local, tribal and private sector partners into the HSE. 
Immediately following the devastating strike, the nation focused all of its intelligence 
collection efforts on the prevention of future terrorist attacks from abroad and from 
within. Nine separate national strategies were written to address elements of homeland 
security. They include, in part, a National Intelligence Strategy published by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2005; a National Strategy for Homeland 
Security published by the White House in 2007; a National Counterintelligence Strategy 
published by the DNI in 2009; a National Security Strategy of the United States 
published by the White House in 2010; a National Counterterrorism Strategy published 
by the White House in 2011, and most recently a National Strategy for Information 
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Sharing and Safeguarding published by the White House in 2012. The lack of any 
national level guidance or strategy related to the collection of domestic intelligence 
within the HSE other than organizational relationships, classified, or otherwise appears to 
be a glaring oversight.  
The DHS 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report defined the 
HSE as federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector entities.1 The 
HSE serves organized complex organizations, and their relationships with the national 
intelligence architecture through the National Network. Collecting and analyzing 
information through the National Network combines state and local criminal intelligence 
and national intelligence to address transnational threats.2 The National Network in 
partnership with the HSE provides an essential information collection and analysis 
function in efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the homeland.  
Within this complex HSE, there are several USIC intelligence cycle process 
models being taught. Given today’s transnational threat environment, this thesis is 
intended to inform readers regarding the adaptation and adherence to the intelligence 
cycle process model within the HSE. The adherence to a consistent intelligence cycle 
process model within the National Network, as an internal entity of the complex HSE, is 
critical to producing common operating threat pictures at all levels of government. 
The National Network is the integration of nontraditional intelligence entities into 
the practice of intelligence collection and analysis essential for supporting the national 
intelligence architecture. In order to examine the National Network’s adeptness to adapt 
to the intelligence cycle process model, it is fitting to review the history of the USIC 
germane to the intelligence process. The USIC serves as a coalition of agencies and 
organizations that work both independently and collaboratively with the primary mission 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
May 2012, 2. 
2 50 U.S. Code Section 402(i)(5) defines transnational threats as any transnational activity (including 
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United 
States that includes any individual or group that engages in such activity. 
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to collect and produce intelligence. The USIC has evolved tremendously in size, 
structure, and scope since its creation more than 60 years ago following World War II 
and the 1947 National Security Act. However, the conceptual intelligence cycle process 
has essentially gone unchanged since its inception. Notwithstanding, the intelligence 
cycle process phases or steps have increased over the years. 
Over the 60 years the USIC has existed, domestic intelligence activities have 
raised serious concerns regarding privacy, civil rights and civil liberties as a result of 
abuses of authority and illegal behavior by federal and local law enforcement intelligence 
entities. Providing federally funded training to the National Network that supports 
employing the intelligence cycle process model is once again raising concerns among 
privacy advocates and American citizens. Providing comprehensive, consistent 
intelligence cycle process training to the National Network may serve to decrease privacy 
concerns while also verifying a concerted federal effort in the proper execution of the 
intelligence process. Literature reveals even the best analysis will do nothing to affect 
national security and crime rates at the state and local level, if it does not influence 
practices within the National Network. 
Chapter II offers a literature review essential for identifying critical premises, as 
well as contributions necessary for exploring the adherence to the intelligence cycle 
process model within the National Network. The main goal of the literature review is to 
understand intelligence cycle process models and to provide context for homeland 
security and intelligence professionals. Fundamental to this chapter is defining the USIC, 
the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise (HSIE), the HSE, and key intelligence 
terms. As important is the identification and illumination of the various intelligence cycle 
process models being used within the HSE. 
The 1947 USIC structure has expanded to its current structure that includes 17 
organizations charged with conducting intelligence activities both foreign and domestic. 
The 17-member USIC is composed of a community coordinator, six program managers, 
five departmental elements, and five services.  The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence serves as the USIC community coordinator.  The six USIC entities that serve 
as intelligence program managers are the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
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Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (National Security Branch), and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency. The five departmental elements identified as USIC members within 
specific organizations are the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security 
Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Department of the 
Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Research. The five services identified as USIC 
members are US Air Force Intelligence, US Army Intelligence, US Coast Guard 
Intelligence, US Marine Corps Intelligence, and US Navy Intelligence.3   
Originally, the 1947 USIC structure and the function of its intelligence cycle 
process model were designed to provide essential information to the president, 
policymakers, federal organizations, and military communities. Today, the growth of the 
USIC and its purpose has expanded beyond federal elements to include state, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, and private sector entities necessary to enhance domestic intelligence 
capabilities.  
Chapter III is intended to offer illustrations relevant to the challenges of executing 
domestic intelligence activities. The central points are identifying the national security 
focus of domestic intelligence policies, the exploitation of domestic intelligence 
authorities and cultural differences between the USIC and elements of the HSE that affect 
the employment of the intelligence cycle process model. 
Chapter IV presents a case study of the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon 
bombing in the context of the intelligence cycle process model adherence necessary to 
detect the threat and provide intelligence to policy and decision makers with information 
in order to prevent the bombing. This case study was selected in an effort demonstrate the 
conceptual intelligence cycle process model, in action, within the context of the National 
Network and the broader HSE. Additionally, the case study offers the challenges with 
employing the intelligence cycle process model within the National Network at the state 
                                                 




and local level and supporting the 2003 National Criminal Information Sharing Plan 
(NCISP) efforts to prevent terrorism.  
Chapter V is intended to offer a reading on the intelligence cycle process model 
and the HSE relevant to intelligence cycle model training and national integration of state 
and local law enforcement, the private sector, and implementation challenges given the 
complex HSE. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The USIC was not designed to serve as a concept intended to detect significant 
national security threats originating or residing within our nation’s borders4 but was 
focused on foreign intelligence activities. This thesis evaluates if the intelligence cycle 
process model supports the performance of domestic intelligence activities within the 
National Network that serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the 
receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal 
government and state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners.5  Research 
provided little has been done to study the weaving together of local, state, and federal 
counterterrorism efforts6 that support domestic intelligence activities and the reliance on 
the intelligence cycle process model.  
The National Network has been in development since 2003 and was established to 
serve as intelligence and analytical hubs7 at the state, local, tribal, and territorial level. 
The National Network is supported by training and technical assistance in employing the 
intelligence cycle process model from DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other 
                                                 
4 Intelligence and National Security Alliance, Intelligence to Protect the Homeland: Taking Stock Ten 
Years Later and Looking Ahead. White paper, Arlington: Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 2011. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-
urban-area-fusion-centers. 
6 Frank J. Cilluffo, Joseph R. Clark, and Michael P. Downing, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law 
Enforcement Perspectives, Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Research, Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, George Washington University, September 2011.  
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Role of Fusion Centers in Countering Violent Extremism, 
October 2012. 
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institutions. Providing federally funded training to the National Network on intelligence 
cycle process model variations, and their employment philosophies, serve as limitations 
to establishing fusion center baseline capabilities and their integration into national 
intelligence. Annual assessments are conducted on the National Network by DHS in 
efforts to evaluate baseline capabilities and their integration into national intelligence. 
The National Network completes an Online Self Assessment Tool that includes numerous 
multiple-choice and “yes/no” questions focused on the critical operational capabilities 
(COC) in support of the 2011 and 2012 DHS-led fusion center assessments.8  While the 
COC questions focus on distinct aspects of the intelligence cycle process model, the 2011 
and 2012 assessments do not evaluate the adherence to or wholly employing the 
intelligence cycle process model. A publication written by noted author and academic 
David Carter, who developed a local intelligence guide titled Law Enforcement 
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, affirms, 
“the need for a different approach to the intelligence cycle exists for the federal level 
compared to state, local, tribal and territorial elements because of different intelligence 
demands.”9 
The July 2010 DHS Bottom Up Review (BUR) that provides the results of a 
department-wide assessment reported, “there had been no systematic effort to ensure that 
these centers establish and maintain a baseline level of capability so that they are able to 
become fully integrated into national efforts to gather, analyze, and share information 
needed to protect our communities.”10  The 2010 BUR was addressed by the subsequent 
annual DHS-led National Network assessments. Notwithstanding, elements external to 
the National Network observed continued challenges with integrating local elements 
within the national intelligence architecture. A 2011 report by The Homeland Security 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
accessed October 8, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20C
enters%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
9 David Carter, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Law 
Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, 2nd ed., 
January 2009, 14.  
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review Report, July 2010. 
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Policy Institute’s Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Research indicated 62 percent of 
the intelligence chiefs representing major metropolitan police departments in the U.S. 
believed the “national [federal] intelligence enterprise was such that it left them unable to 
develop a complete understanding of their local threat environment”11 — an intended 
product of the intelligence cycle process model.  
B. OVERVIEW 
Intelligence derived from analyzed information through the intelligence cycle 
process serves as a principle tool for supporting the nation’s counterterrorism efforts and 
offers law enforcement and homeland security officials with insights and advantages over 
terrorists. However, there are multiple intelligence cycle concepts within the USIC and 
the HSE. The various intelligence cycle process models range from a four-step process to 
a seven-step process.  
The first depicted model of an intelligence cycle process was documented in 1944 
and titled the Production of Military Intelligence, a Continuous Process.12  Moreover, in 
1948, Robert Rigby Glass published a book titled Intelligence for Commanders becoming 
the first known academic reference to an intelligence cycle process.13  Subsequently there 
have been numerous books about the USIC and the intelligence cycle process. Author 
Leo D. Carl refers to the intelligence cycle as a five-step process in his 1990 book titled 
The International Dictionary of Intelligence.14  Author Robert M. Clark in his 2004 
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach refers to the traditional intelligence 
cycle as a six-step process.15  The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
                                                 
11 Frank J. Cilluffo, Joseph R. Clark, and Michael P. Downing, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law 
Enforcement Perspectives. Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Research. Homeland Security Policy 
Institute. George Washington University, September 2011. 
12 Michael E. Bigelow, “A Short History of Army Intelligence,”  Military Intelligence, July-September 
2012, 31.  
13 Sources and Methods: Part 4 – The Traditional Intelligence Cycle and Its History, accessed 
December 1, 2011, http://sourceandmethods.blogspot.com/2011/05/part-4-traditional-intelligence-
cycle.html.  
14 Leo d. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA. International Defense 
Consulting Service, 1990), 183. 




Defense and Security Course NS4146 titled Intelligence for Homeland Security, by Dr. 
William Lahneman, refers to a seven-step process. The aforementioned noting of 
intelligence cycle process models reveals the diverse number of models and aids in 
identifying the potential challenges with providing consistent training and adherence to 
the National Network and the greater HSE. The DHS Homeland Security Advisory 
Council (HSAC), which provides advice and recommendations to the DHS Secretary on 
matters related to homeland security, noted effective intelligence and information fusion 
requires reliance on existing traditional USIC analytic processes. The HSAC defined 
“fusion” as a cyclic process that includes elements of a five-step intelligence cycle 
process.16  This provides yet another version of the intelligence cycle process model. 
Table 1 provides a depiction of different intelligence cycle process models of USIC 
members, academia, and a state and local law enforcement element.  
                                                 
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland 
Security Intelligence and Information Fusion. Homeland Security Advisory Council. April 28, 2005, 5–7. 
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The single intelligence cycle attribute used by all within the various intelligence 
cycle models is the “collection” phase. There are various intelligence cycle process 
models used by the USIC and now being taught to the National Network by federally 
funded entities. As an example, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the 
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National Counterterrorism Center, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT), the Department of Justice State and Local Anti-terrorism Training Program, and 
the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEA) each 
deliver intelligence training opportunities on intelligence cycle process model. The 
complexities of HSE are intensified when observed through the lens of different training 
entities and varied intelligence cycle process models. Consistent and clear intelligence 
cycle process employment within the National Network presents challenges with 
integration into the national intelligence architecture without a uniform training.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The research process applies the basic program evaluation principles to gather 
information on the intelligence cycle process model adherence within the National 
Network and greater HSE. The research objective seeks to evaluate whether the National 
Network and HSE members adhere to the intelligence cycle process model when 
performing public safety and homeland security related missions. 
This thesis employs a qualitative research method that analyzes and interprets 
publicly available academic and policy information gathered from government and 
nongovernment institutions regarding the conceptual and practical writings relevant to the 
intelligence cycle process model. In addition to the academic and policy data gathered, 
the writer provides a case study analysis of the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon 
bombing focused on practical adherence to the phases of a general intelligence cycle 
process model. The applied research method is intended to provide the framework for 
exploring the employment of the intelligence cycle process model within the current 
HSE. A case study approach was chosen in an effort to explore adherence to the 
intelligence cycle process within the National Network in context to its origin and 
intended purpose. It is in this setting that the writer explores the National Network’s 
adherence to the intelligence cycle process model considering their integration as a 
critical state and local asset within the broader national intelligence architecture. 
Employing the intelligence cycle process model within the National Network and 
the greater HSE presents privacy concerns. Literature reveals these privacy concerns are 
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focused on the collection of information on Americans who have not violated the rule of 
law. Privacy concerns among policymakers also exist regarding the proper collection of 
information in support of domestic intelligence activities engagement by public and 
private HSE entities. Lastly, scholars and practitioners present concerns questioning 
whether the intelligence cycle process model serves as effective analytic tradecraft in 
reducing strategic surprises associated with a threat while simultaneously enhancing 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The significance of examining the intelligence cycle process model within the 
HSE is well intentioned given it was not originally designed or intended to detect 
significant national security threats originating or residing within our nation’s borders.17  
The literature examined provided a spectrum of knowledge about the intelligence cycle 
process model within the pre- and post-9/11 domestic intelligence environment. The 
evaluation of intelligence literature provided by academic, organizational and 
nongovernment consulting institutions revealed minimal discourse concerning the 
intelligence cycle process employment to support domestic intelligence activities. 
The research literature includes publications from within and outside the 
government by high-level policy organizations and academia. The concentration of 
government publications reviewed were congressional legislation associated with 
homeland security and intelligence, as well as homeland security intelligence reports and 
information sharing related products of the Government Accountability Office and 
Congressional Research Service. A review of public and nonprofit organizations serving 
as consultants to the intelligence community and homeland security provided intelligence 
journals and articles, as well as academic intelligence publications by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and public institutions. Finally, as appropriate, USIC organizational and 
National Network documents were reviewed specifically relating to intelligence cycle 
process model training and policies.  
The literature review provided no USIC or HSE doctrinal information on the 
adoption of the intelligence cycle as a formal process by USIC or HSE members. 
Additionally, there are no specific standards concerning intelligence processes for 
domestic intelligence collection, whether at the federal level or the state and local level. 
However, there are documents that provide guiding principles regarding domestic 
intelligence collection and the use of the intelligence cycle process. The principle 
document governing the USIC (federal-level) role relevant to domestic intelligence 
                                                 
17 Intelligence and National Security Alliance, Intelligence to Protect the Homeland: Taking Stock Ten 
Years Later and Looking Ahead. White paper, Arlington: Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 2011. 
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activities is Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12333. The DHS/DOJ endorsed guidelines 
for introducing the intelligence cycle process model into the National Network are the 
2006 Fusion Center Guidelines18 and the TCL19 for state and local partners operating 
externally to the National Network. In March 2002, during an Intelligence Summit, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), an organization established in 1893 
to serve as the professional voice of law enforcement, adopted the intelligence-led 
policing philosophy.20  In 2011, the Major City Chief’s Association (MCCA) initiated the 
Major City Chiefs’ Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (MCCCIE) to better integrate state 
and local criminal intelligence and counterterrorism operations and address the 
deficiencies of standardizing integration and intelligence collection practices.21  These 
guiding principles focus on the administration and management of the collection process, 
not necessarily a standardized employment of an intelligence cycle process model. An 
assessment of the limited information made available that focuses on domestic 
intelligence and the intelligence cycle employment reveals information gaps concerning 
its effectiveness and appropriateness within the post-9/11 HSE. This thesis attempts to 
explore whether the intelligence cycle is the best process model for domestic intelligence. 
This literature review includes defining key intelligence enterprises, the term 
“intelligence” within the USIC and law enforcement, intelligence cycle process models, 
and training the intelligence cycle process to the HSE and National Network. The key 
intelligence enterprises discussed are the USIC, the Homeland Security Intelligence 
Enterprise (HSIE), and the HSE.  
                                                 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines Developing and Sharing 
Information and Intelligence in a New Era; Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at 
the Local, State, and Federal Levels; Law Enforcement Intelligence, Public Safety, and the Private Sector, 
accessed July 16, 2013, http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf. 
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, September 2007, accessed July 16, 2013,  
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf. 
20 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for 
Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels. Alexandria, VA, 2002. 




A. DEFINING KEY INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISES AND THE TERM 
“INTELLIGENCE”  
The USIC is formally defined in EO 12333 titled United States Intelligence 
Activities. An EO serves as an official document to manage the operations of the federal 
government.22 The EO 12333 is an extremely complex order that sets forth the 
foundation of the USIC and the administration’s directions regarding “timely and 
accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign 
powers, organizations, and persons and their agents.”23  Its support of national security 
consists of three key parts: Part 1) defines each intelligence community member and the 
particular roles and responsibilities; Part 2) focuses on the protection of civil liberties and 
privacy rights; and Part 3) provides relevant definitions. The 17-members consisting of 
the USIC are primarily concerned with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, as 
prescribed in EO 12333, with the only agencies focusing on domestic intelligence are the 
FBI and the newly created DHS.24 EO 12333 was originally signed in 1981 under 
the Reagan Administration and since amended in 2008 under the Bush Administration 
because of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. EO 12333 provides the goals, direction, and 
responsibilities of USIC members performing intelligence activities within the U.S. There 
have been several amendments to EO 12333 since the original signing: in 2003 by EO 
13284, in 2004 by EO 13355, and lastly in 2008 by EO 13470. The 2003 amendment by 
EO 13284 provided for the inclusion of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The 
2004 amendment by EO 13355 was designed to strengthen the management of the 
intelligence community. Lastly, the 2008 amendment by EO 13470 made administrative 
changes, to include language focused on state, local, and tribal governments as well as 
the private sector: 
State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and 
defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United 
                                                 
22 National Archives, accessed July 27, 2013, www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-
orders/about.html. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sephan J. Flanagen, Managing the Intelligence Community, International Security, vol. 10, no. 1, 
(Summer 1985), MIT Press, accessed June 13, 2012,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538790. 
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States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into 
account the responsibilities and requirements of state, local and tribal 
governments and, as  appropriate, private sector entities, when 
undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and 
intelligence to protect the United States.25  
While every USIC member has the authority and responsibility for implementing 
EO 12333 within their respective organizations, the two chief organizations responsible 
for ensuring successful implementing and providing direction is the DNI and DOJ/FBI. 
The DHS HSIE consists of three DHS headquarter elements that have an 
intelligence function: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Homeland 
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, and the Intelligence Division of the 
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. It also consists of the intelligence 
element of six operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service.26  
While there is a described HSIE, the term homeland security intelligence has yet to be 
defined or codified in law.27  Noted author Frances Townsend, the former Homeland 
Security Advisor under President Bush and former Chairwoman of the nonprofit, public-
private organization Intelligence and National Security Alliance, defined homeland 
security intelligence as a discipline that depends on the successful fusion of foreign and 
domestic intelligence to produce the kind of actionable intelligence necessary to protect 
the homeland.28  
The DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis serves as the Department’s 
Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) responsible for leading the HSIE. The DHS’ 
Management Directive Number 8110 titled Intelligence Integration and Management 
                                                 
25 Executive Order 13470, Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence 
Activities, Part 1 1.1(f), accessed July 27, 2013,  www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13470.htm. 
26 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: 
Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, R40602, May 27, 2009, 3. 
27 Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory 
Definitions, and Approaches, RL33616, January 14, 2009, 9. 
28 Frances Townsend, Intelligence to Protect the Homeland - Taking Stock Ten Years Later. 
Intelligence and National Security Alliance 1 2011, 3. 
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established the CINT position to effectively integrate and manage DHS intelligence 
programs, as well as serve as the principle for leading, governing, integrating, and 
managing intelligence functions throughout DHS.29  The DHS CINT is tasked with being 
the primary connection between DHS and the USIC, as well as the primary source of 
information for state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. To date, there has only 
been two Senate confirmed DHS CINTs. The first CINT was the Honorable Charles 
Allen, a 40-year senior Central Intelligence Agency official who served as the first DHS 
CINT from 2005–2009 and was responsible for developing the department’s intelligence 
architecture.30 The second CINT was the Honorable Caryn Wagner, a 30-year DoD 
official who served as the DHS CINT from 2010 to 201231 and during her tenure 
provided a focus of “creating a true homeland security information-sharing enterprise 
through a greater focus on state, local, and major urban area fusion centers,” as well as 
“unify and sustain the DHS intelligence enterprise.”32 
The HSE was defined by a DHS report on the National Network as federal, state, 
local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector entities.33  Integration of the HSE into 
the national intelligence architecture was intended to occur through the National 
Network. Other than the 2011 DHS report, the examination of literature does not provide 
any other formal HSE definition, although the term is frequently used in government and 
academic articles. Similar to the term homeland security intelligence, the failure to 
provide a unified and accepted definition among stakeholders encumbers the ability to 
assess the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle process model.  
                                                 
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Management Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and 
Management, accessed August 4, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_8110_intelligence_integration_and_management.
pdf. 
30 Chertoff Group, accessed August 4, 2013,  http://chertoffgroup.com/bios/charles-allen.php.  
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 4, 2013,  http://www.dhs.gov/caryn-
wagner.  
32 Anthony L. Kimery, Homeland Security Today, “DHS I&A Chief Outlines New Vision,” May 13, 
2010, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.hstoday.us. 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
May 2012, 2. 
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Intelligence is a term that has multiple meanings dependent upon the literary 
contribution whether it has a USIC or law enforcement origin. An examination of 
literature commonly discussed what “intelligence” means or at least how an author 
intended to use the term. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011, academic 
and federal government literature largely referred to intelligence within the context of 
issues related to national security associated with defense, foreign policy, and internal 
(domestic) security.34  However, the term “intelligence” within the context of law 
enforcement often refers to significant information that is relevant to an impending event 
and that will be a contribution to the positive outcome of a specific case.35  Lowenthal 
subscribes that intelligence can be defined from three different perspectives: 1) 
“Intelligence as a product – intelligence that can be thought of as a product of the 
[process],” 2) “Intelligence as a process – intelligence [that] can be thought of as the 
means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, 
analyzed, and disseminated…,” and 3) “Intelligence as an organization – 
intelligence…thought of as the units that carry out its various functions.”36  
In the post-9/11 environment, intelligence began to be more widely accepted and 
used among state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector elements as key partners 
within the HSE. For the purpose of this thesis, “intelligence” is defined as the collective 
“functions [and] activities…which are involved in the [intelligence] process [model] of 
planning, gathering, and analyzing information of potential value to decision makers.”37 
 
                                                 
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
May 2012, 4. 
35 Roger G. Dunham, Geoffrey P., Alpert, Jennifer E. Davis, and Robert W. Taylor, Intelligence-Led 
Policing and Fusion Centers, Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings (6th ed., Waveland 
Press, 2010), 225. 
36 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2012). 9. 
37 Leo D. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA. International Defense 
Consulting Service, 1990), 178. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODELS 
A review of journals and scholarly publications provided descriptions of 
intelligence cycle process models. However, it was difficult uncovering its origination 
and the policies associated with its formal adoption within the USIC. According to the 
International Journal of Information Management, an international peer-reviewed journal, 
the use of the intelligence cycle was first derived from the U.S. Army.38  In 1920, the 
Army’s Chief of Staff attempted to establish the first Army-wide intelligence doctrine via 
the distribution of Intelligence Regulations.39  Author Michael Bigelow, Command 
Historian with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, contends the first 
depicted model of the intelligence process was documented in 1944, under the title the 
Production of Military Intelligence, a Continuous Process.40   
In 1952, intelligence collection, the single most common intelligence cycle 
attribute was defined as the procuring, assembling and organizing of information and 
served as the first step in the processing of intelligence information. It is now considered 
the third step or phase in the intelligence cycle process model and “…officially defined as 
‘the exploitation of sources of information by collection agencies and delivery of 
information to the proper intelligence-processing unit for use in the production of 
intelligence.’”41  The 1952 definition focused on intelligence collection targeted against 
communist nation-states and not the domestic intelligence environment of today.  
The intelligence cycle process model in simple discourse involves structured steps 
necessary for gathering required data in order to create knowledge. The created 
knowledge (intelligence) in the early years served executive and congressional 
policymakers primarily focused on Cold War adversaries in an attempt to uncover foreign 
intelligence activities and assist with supporting global national security interests.  
                                                 
38 “Targeting Intelligence Gathering in a Dynamic Competitive Environment,” International Journal of 
Information Management, 20, iss. 3, 2000: 184. 
39 Michael E. Bigelow, “A Short History of Army Intelligence.” Military Intelligence, July-September 
2012, 21. 
40 Ibid., 31. 
41 Leo D. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA. International Defense 
Consulting Service, 1990), 59. 
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Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI served as the principle federal 
agency responsible for domestic intelligence. In response to criticism by Congress 
following the attacks, the FBI initiated reforms to increase their collection and analysis of 
domestic intelligence. Nonetheless, critics contend FBI intelligence collection play a 
secondary role to their law enforcement mission.42 Because of the September 11, 2001, 
Al-Qaida terrorist attacks that emphasized intelligence failures, the stated integration of 
the intelligence cycle process model became a common theme among public safety 
officials at the state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector levels. The new intelligence 
mission has by both necessity and practice expanded beyond the federal-level originally 
identified in the 1947 National Security Act and is now based on the principle of shared 
responsibility and partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and 
the American people in a concerted national effort to prevent future terrorist attacks 
within the U.S.43   
There are multiple intelligence cycle process model versions within the USIC, the 
HSIE and the HSE, which range from four-step process to a seven-step process. Many 
authors indicated that the intelligence cycle process model is more or less a common 
practice of how intelligence professionals perform the functions of intelligence. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the intelligence cycle is defined according to the official USIC 
definition as “the steps by which information is acquired and converted into intelligence 
and made available to consumers.”44  Similarly to the many academic descriptions of the 
intelligence cycle process models, USIC organizational models depend on the 
organization and its mission-space. The diverse number of intelligence cycle models 
stresses the need for an HSE-wide accepted intelligence cycle process doctrine.  
                                                 
42 Eric Rosenbach, Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community. 
Belfere Center for Science and International Affairs. The Intelligence and Policy Project. Background 
Memorandum for the 111th Congress. July 2009, 44–49. 
43 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, 2. 
44 Leo D. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA. International Defense 
Consulting Service, 1990), 183. 
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C. CORE ISSUE 
The intelligence cycle process model continually strives to better understand the 
threat environment or a threat issue. Understanding is accomplished and supported by 
relying on past and present information necessary to deliver a probabilistic view of the 
future. The basic intelligence cycle process model involves sequenced steps necessary for 
gathering the information in order to create the desired understanding. While literature 
plainly reveals the cyclical structure of intelligence cycle process model, literature also 
suggests the intelligence cycle process model does not sufficiently describe how the 
intelligence process works at the operational stages of domestic intelligence activities 
within the National Network. Within the USIC, however, the intelligence cycle process 
model appears to be an academic process conducted primarily by analysts and not 
operational intelligence collectors. As an example, in a doctoral dissertation written by 
Ms. Bridget Nolen on USIC information sharing and collaboration she noted “An analyst 
will sometimes write a paper on a self-generated topic, but much of the time the analyst is 
responding to a ‘tasking,’ which means that a policymaker has a specific question that he 
or she wants a subject matter expert to answer. The analyst drafts a response as quickly as 
possible by putting together the available information from a variety of classified and 
open sources, and must then begin the arduous coordination process to ensure that other 
analysts in the Intelligence Community concur with the assessment. After the paper is 
coordinated, it must then go through many more layers of editing through management, 
and then a final edit for style, structure, and formatting before it can be published—that 
is, delivered to policymakers.”45    
A critical juncture in the process identified by Nolen is coordination. This 
corresponds with the independent phase “production” or the joint phase “analysis and 
production” dependent on which intelligence cycle process model is being used. During 
this phase, it is noted “...each paper an analyst writes is considered a ‘community’ 
product...,so it is important that other experts vet an analyst’s work before the policy 
                                                 
45 Bridget Rose Nolen, Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence 
Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center (PhD diss., University of 
Pennsylvania, 2013), 90. 
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maker reads it. At this theoretical level, coordination makes sense. In practice, however, 
the coordination process frequently transforms into a battle over turf, a venue for blatant 
backstabbing, and a practice rooted in nitpicking and meaningless editing....”46 Another 
cogent example identifying the challenges of finished intelligence—the theoretical end 
result of a perfectly functioning intelligence cycle process model—is provided from an 
interview excerpt “NCTC has to coordinate with everyone. It is difficult when DHS 
thinks they can call the editors personally and hold your piece because they think it 
interferes with their business project. Like with terrorist documents—we might write 
about how terrorists exploit student visas, and well, State issues the student visas and they 
do not like the fact that we are criticizing the loopholes in their system. So they’ll hold 
the piece or try to kill it.”47 These issues point out the practical challenges with 
employing the intelligence cycle process model within the USIC established in 1947, 
accordingly, similar challenges are present within the complex National Network and the 
HSE. 
Author Leo D. Carl reference to the intelligence cycle as a five-step process in his 
1990 The International Dictionary of Intelligence includes: 1) Planning and Direction, 2) 
Collection, 3) Processing, 4) Production, and 5) Dissemination.48  Author Robert M. 
Clark in his 2004 Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach describes the 
traditional intelligence cycle as a six-step process: 1) Requirements, needs, 2) Planning, 
direction, 3) Collection, 4) Processing, 5) Analysis, and 6) Dissemination.49  Lastly, the 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Course NS4146 
titled Intelligence for Homeland Security, by Dr. William Lahneman offers to a seven-
step process: 1) Requirements, 2) Collection, 3) Process and Exploitation, 4) Analysis 
and Production, 5) Dissemination, 6) Consumption and 7) Feedback. The aforementioned 
                                                 
46 Bridget Rose Nolen, Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence 
Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center (PhD diss., University of 
Pennsylvania, 2013), 90–91.  
47 Ibid., 98–99. 
48 Leo D. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA. International Defense 
Consulting Service, 1990), 183. 
49 Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2004), 14. 
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noting of intelligence cycle process models reveals the diverse number of models and 
aids in identifying the potential challenges with providing consistent training and 
adherence to the National Network and broader HSE.  
The DHS HSAC cyclic process included a five-step intelligence cycle process: 1) 
Planning and Requirements Development, 2) Collection, 3) Analysis, 4) Dissemination, 
Tasking, and Archiving, and 5) Reevaluation.50  This provides yet another version of the 
intelligence cycle process model.  
The four figures below serve as diagrams illustrating the diversity of intelligence 
cycle process models, similar to the table provided in Chapter I. While there are minor 
but important differences, not one of the four is exactly alike, although each element is a 
member of the national intelligence architecture. 
                                                 
50 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland 




Figure 1.   FBI Intelligence Cycle51  
 
 




                                                 
51 Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 4, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle. 




Figure 3.   CIA Intelligence Cycle53 
 
 
Figure 4.   DoD Joint Publication Intelligence Cycle54 
The integration of state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector elements as 
nontraditional intelligence partners of the HSE has shepherded the need to fundamentally 
change the requirement to provide intelligence not just to the federal level organizations, 
the president and Congress, but also to state and local policymakers and operational 
                                                 
53 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 4, 2013,  http://vmc.cia-
dia.50megs.com/fboi/facttell/intcycle.htm. 
54 U.S. Department of Defense, accessed September 4, 2013,  
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/044.pdf. 
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entities. It involves evaluating the profound differences between providing classified 
information to policymakers, such as during the Cold War, and providing homeland 
security intelligence and threat information to the private sector, public organizations and 
U.S. Citizens in a post-9/11 domestic intelligence environment.55   
The 9/11 Commission Act, Section 511 provides DHS shall establish a DHS 
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative necessary for establishing 
partnerships with state, local, and regional fusion centers; specifically Section (b) (11) 
mandates providing training to state, local, and regional fusion centers.56  The DHS I&A 
concurred with the responsibility per Section 511 to develop training curricula on the 
intelligence cycle process for state and local officials.57  In satisfying this mandate, DHS 
deployed intelligence officers charged with managing the intelligence cycle in their areas 
of responsibility.58  While fusion center personnel receive DHS sponsored intelligence 
cycle training from a variety of federally funded institutions, this is not the case for a 
majority of public safety officials operating outside the National Network such as the 
MCCCIE initiative.  
The Major Cities Chiefs Association, an organization comprised of police chiefs 
and sheriffs from 63 of the largest law enforcement agencies in the U.S., initiated the 
MCCCIE in 2011. Serving as a significant representative of the state and local criminal 
intelligence community, the MCCCIE’s aim is to better integrate state and local criminal 
intelligence and counterterrorism operations in support of the National Network by 
addressing the deficiencies of standardizing integration and intelligence collection 
                                                 
55 Elaine C. Kamarck, Transforming the Intelligence Community: Improving the Collection and 
Management of Information. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, IBM Center for 
The Business of Government, October 2005, 11. 
56 110th Congress Public Law, Public Law 110–53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007.  
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers is Evolving. 
Office of Inspector General Report – OIG-09–12. October 2008. 16. 
58 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Responsibilities of Intelligence Officers, accessed March 7, 
2013, http://www.dhs.gov/deployed-intelligence-officers-and-protective-security-advisors. 
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practices within the state and local environment.59 Figure 5 depicts a four-step 
Prediction-Led Policing Business Process Model that may be viewed in the context of the 
intelligence cycle process model. The Prediction-Led Policing Business Process Model is 
based on a concept established by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing with the first 
two phases focusing on collecting and analyzing criminal information necessary for 
establishing predictions and the last two phases focus on response to the predictions.60  
The parallels between the intelligence cycle process model and the prediction-led 
policing process model is the critical need for information collection and analysis. 
This critical segment of the HSE receives considerably less training on the 
intelligence cycle process model, although it oversees far more personnel than the 
National Network. There are questions law enforcement intelligence analysts use to 
ascertain a threat or the threat situation using the intelligence cycle process model that are 
not readily obvious to law enforcement investigators.61 The contrasting perspectives 
associated with the intelligence cycle process model between law enforcement 
intelligence analysts and law enforcement investigators parallel the environmental setting 
within the USIC between intelligence analysts and operational intelligence collectors.  
 
                                                 
59 Major Cities Chiefs Criminal Intelligence Enterprise, accessed August 25, 2013, 
https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/mcca_criminal_intelligence_enterprise_initiative_20120329.p
df. 
60 RAND, Predictive Policing – The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations, 
Prediction-Led Policing Business Process Model, accessed October 3, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf. 
61 Timothy Connors, and John Rollins, Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute. State 
Fusion Center Processes and Procedures: Best Practices and Recommendations (Policing Terrorism 




Figure 5.   The Prediction-Led Policing Business Process Model, RAND RR233–
1.162 
The terrorist events of 9/11 vastly transformed law enforcement communities 
across the U.S. and the approach to preventing and combating terrorism that focused on 
proactive posturing versus reactive engagement.63  New transnational enemies possibly 
operating within the homeland in the form of international terrorists and transnational 
issues, such as narcotics and money laundering have risen in importance becoming more 
urgent than the previous Cold War era geopolitical concerns. As the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities have both become increasingly involved in the international 
aspects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and international organized crime, the National 
Network is positioned to access the USIC’s considerable wealth of information on these 
subjects. However, in considering the fulfillment of these capabilities by the HSE, this 
issue has been the most difficult to resolve.64   
 
                                                 
62 RAND, accessed October 3, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf. 
63 Roger G. Dunham, Geoffrey P. Alpert, Jennifer E. Davis, and Robert W. Taylor, Intelligence-Led 
Policing and Fusion Centers, Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, 6th ed, Waveland Press, 
2010, 224. 
64 The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century: Staff Study - Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence House of Representatives 104th Congress, accessed March 5, 2013, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-IC21/html/GPO-IC21–13.html. 
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The HSIE, through DHS I&A, authorizes intelligence collection activities that 
serve to support the National Network and the HSE in efforts to identify emerging 
homeland security threats. The DHS I&A intelligence collection efforts of DHS 
Intelligence Officers supporting the National Network was detailed in a July 29, 2008 
DHS Memorandum. On April 3, 2008, DHS CINT Honorable Charles Allen under DHS 
Intelligence Oversight procedures defined homeland security threats to include “all 
threats or hazards, regardless of origin, that relate to: critical infrastructure or key 
resources; a significant public safety, public health or environmental impact; political, 
societal and economic infrastructure; border security; the proliferation or use of weapons 
of mass destruction; or other potential catastrophic events including man-made and 
natural disasters.”65   
An examination of literature provides general knowledge and reveals minimal 
discourse concerning the intelligence cycle process model employment within the context 
of domestic intelligence collection activities, specifically within the National Network. 
DHS and other entities continue to provide training and instruction on various 
intelligence cycle process models to the 78 state and major urban area fusion centers that 
embody the National Network.  
Lowenthal proclaims one of the stated goals of the U.S. intelligence process 
(intelligence cycle) is to have “analysis-driven collection.”  A short hand way of 
recognizing that collection priorities should reflect the intelligence needs required to 
produce analysis.66   
There are disagreements in literature as writer Arthur S. Hulnick, a professor at 
Boston University who served seven years as an U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer and 
28 years with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), claims the intelligence cycle is 
really not a very good description of the ways in which the intelligence process works 
and “the notion that policymakers or intelligence consumers provide guidance to 
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intelligence managers to begin the intelligence process is incorrect.”67  Robert Clark, a 
42-year Intelligence Analyst, faculty member of the Intelligence and Security Academy 
and a professor of intelligence studies at the University of Maryland University College, 
likewise challenges the intelligence cycle process model’s effectiveness and contends 
“intelligence is organized around the flawed concept of an intelligence cycle”68 and “over 
the years the intelligence cycle has become somewhat of a theoretical concept…[and] 
when pressed many intelligence officers admit that the intelligence process ‘really 
doesn’t work like that.’”69  
The evaluation of the intelligence cycle process model, based on the writers’ 
presentation, suggest the theoretical intelligence cycle is a simple process beginning with 
customer needs and ending with providing a product that satisfies those needs. 
Inconsistencies with employing the intelligence cycle process model surface because of 
existing conflicts among intelligence and law enforcement analytic and operational 
components. With the inclusion of DHS into the USIC, along with state and local entities 
as key HSE elements, there exists an essential challenge—what intelligence process 
training should be provided to the National Network and HSE?  In addition, is current 
intelligence cycle process training provided to the National Network and HSE 
appropriate and effective?  Given literature overlooks a standardized intelligence cycle 
process model that does not exist. Furthermore, literature reflects significant historical 
abuses along with current events that illustrate challenges with domestic intelligence 
activities specifically collection.  
Unlike at the federal-level within the USIC, the National Network made up of 
mainly law enforcement centric elements view the intelligence process from a different 
perspective. Prior to using the intelligence cycle as a business practice, state and local law 
enforcement integrated intelligence-led policing as the standard business practice for 
“analysis-driven collection.”  Law enforcement’s acceptance of intelligence-led policing  
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advanced the goal of developing a universal process that would integrate both law 
enforcement and national security intelligence agendas. The result was the intelligence 
cycle process model70 although some have affirmed there are fundamental differences 
between national security and local law enforcement intelligence. The fundamental 
differences that exist between the law enforcement perspective and traditional 
intelligence community perspective, regarding intelligence collection, results in a less 
than effective intelligence platform within the homeland.71 
In a September 2011 publication by the Intelligence and National Security 
Alliance titled Intelligence to Protect the Homeland: Taking Stock Ten Years Later and 
Looking Ahead, former FBI Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence Maureen 
Baginski, a former NSA senior intelligence official who headed the FBI Directorate of 
Intelligence created in 2005, claims that many federal intelligence and law enforcement 
professionals do not recognize the homeland security implications and intricacies of 
criminal information.72  Jennifer Sims, a Senior Fellow for National Security at the 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a Visiting Professor in the Security Studies 
Program at Georgetown University along with Burton Gerber, a CIA Distinguished 
Intelligence Medal recipient and former 39-year CIA employee acknowledges, “[a] 
critical difference between law enforcement and traditional intelligence collection is that 
law enforcement gathers hard truth in the form of evidence; prosecutors and courts 
require this.”  
The intelligence collection phase under the intelligence cycle process model 
covers the gray area and makes estimations, which is what the consumer demands. The 
“gray area” centers on how to effectively perform domestic intelligence activities while 
employing the intelligence cycle process model among HSE members concurrently 
protecting privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. Chapter III offers the historical and 
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post-9/11 challenges of domestic intelligence activities, specifically the collection phase 
of the intelligence cycle process model.  
The HSE receives intelligence training from many organizations, such as DHS 
I&A, DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, MIPT, the Institute for Intergovernmental 
Research, as well as many academic institutions. When combining the many versions of 
the intelligence cycle process model and the various organizations providing intelligence 
training on one of its many versions to the HSE, the question surfaces as to its effective 
adherence.  
D. HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE AND NATIONAL NETWORK 
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE TRAINING 
The previous section of the literature review focused on defining key intelligence 
enterprises, the term “intelligence” within the USIC and law enforcement, and the 
intelligence cycle process and its many variations. This section of the literature review 
will focus on training the intelligence cycle within the HSE and National Network.  
The analysis of limited information made available regarding HSE and National 
Network intelligence cycle employment reveals gaps concerning its effectiveness and 
appropriateness within the post-9/11 environment. The HSE and National Network 
receive training from federal, government sponsored and academic institutions on the 
intelligence cycle process model with an emphasis on enhancing domestic intelligence 
capabilities to prevent future terrorist attacks.  
Providing structured training on the intelligence cycle process model should make 
the most of the HSE and National Network efforts to detect, neutralize, and exploit 
terrorist strategies and tactics. Well-trained analysts within the National Network are 
critical to efficient intelligence analysis. However, even with pristine data, a lack of 
strong analytics may result in less-than-desirable intelligence products and operational 
outcomes.  
Additionally, employing the intelligence cycle process model within the National 
Network and the greater HSE have presented several concerns. Among privacy 
advocates, there are privacy concerns regarding collection of information on Americans 
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who have not violated the rule of law. Among policy makers, there are concerns 
regarding the proper collection of information in support of domestic intelligence 
activities among public and private HSE entities. Lastly, among scholars and 
practitioners, there are concerns the intelligence cycle process model may not serve as an 
effective analytic tradecraft competency in reducing strategic surprises associated with a 
threat, while simultaneously enhancing operational law enforcement and intelligence 
elements. The literature review did not provide standardized doctrinal information on the 
adoption of the intelligence cycle as a formal process by USIC, HSIE or HSE members. 
However, guiding principles such as EO 12333 (as amended), the 2006 Fusion Center 
Guidelines, and the TCL provided a common framework to introduce the intelligence 
cycle process model. 
The DHS State and Local Program Office, in conjunction with the DHS Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DOJ provides intelligence cycle training 
opportunities to the National Network and HSE via the DHS/DOJ Fusion Process 
Technical Assistance Program and Services, the FEMA sponsored MIPT. There are a 
number of academic institutions that also provide intelligence cycle training, most 
notably the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security and 
the Michigan State University. The author and academic David Carter with Michigan 
State University developed a local intelligence guide titled Law Enforcement 
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies 
highlighting the need for a different approach to the intelligence cycle at federal level 
when compared to state, local, tribal and territorial level based on different intelligence 
demands.73  
Literature clearly agrees that the intelligence cycle is used as the traditional 
intelligence process at the federal level within the USIC. Because of the federal 
government’s support to the state and local environment via the National Network, DHS 
provides instruction on the intelligence cycle process to state and local officials within 
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the National Network and limited HSE elements. As highlighted by author David Carter, 
there is a cultural contradiction that exists in traditional law enforcement notwithstanding  
the recent focus on the intelligence-led policing (ILP) model that focuses on identifying 
criminal behavior, reporting criminal activity and preventing future crimes based on 
trends and patterns.  
Mr. Carter acknowledges the private sector is often a legitimate consumer of law 
enforcement intelligence meeting the “right to know” and “need to know” in support of 
information sharing standards. Similar to the majority 18,000 U.S. law enforcement 
agencies, the private sector as a significant element of the HSE that owns an estimated 85 
percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is generally not slated to receive federally 
funded intelligence cycle process training. Moreover, the private sector has a large 
personnel force who, if given the proper information, can significantly increase the “eyes 
and ears” on the street to observe individuals and behaviors that pose threats. However, 
there are information sharing issues that need to be resolved. For example, certain types 
of personal information may be inappropriate for law enforcement to release to the 
private sector. Conversely, proprietary information related to corporate products may also 
be restricted. Despite these limitations, there is a legitimate intelligence role for the 
private sector.74   
Mr. David Cid, MIPT Executive Director, similarly recognizes the law 
enforcement cultural contradiction to intelligence and asserts avoiding strategic surprise 
is a principle function of intelligence that allows law enforcement to be anticipatory and 
proactive in efforts to prevent potential terrorist attacks. However, traditional measures of 
success in law enforcement, such as arrests, indictments, and seizures of property are 
secondary to prevention.75  
Common themes within the literature advances intelligence cycle models as a key 
element of the USIC. The literature also reveals disagreements about its effectiveness at 
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the practitioner level, as well as its many variations based on organizational mission 
space. Finally, the literature overlooks or perhaps shortchanges the question of whether 
the intelligence cycle process model is effective or appropriate within the HSE and the 
National Network, while revealing the challenges of domestic intelligence collection, 
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III. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND EMPLOYING THE 
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL 
We also have no official with sole and comprehensive responsibility for 
domestic intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence 
are being filled by ad hoc initiatives.  
– Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals 
The focus of this thesis provides an academic inquiry into the intelligence cycle 
process adherence within the National Network and the greater HSE. The information 
contained in this publication may reflect the intelligence cycle process as an idealistic 
model while highlighting the challenges of adopting a standardized intelligence cycle 
process acceptable among homeland security professionals. Chapter III is intended to 
offer illustrations relevant to the challenges of executing domestic intelligence activities. 
The central points are identifying the national security focus of domestic intelligence 
policies, the exploitation of domestic intelligence authorities, and cultural differences 
between the USIC and elements of the HSE that effect the employment of the intelligence 
cycle process model. 
A. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES – NATIONAL SECURITY 
FOCUS 
The USIC, established by the 1947 National Security Act because of World War 
II, differs in many ways from its present structure. The 1947 National Security Act 
established a national effort to protect the U.S. from foreign actors in response to the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent Cold War with the Soviet Union. As 
a result of the terrorist acts committed on September 11, 2001, the USIC changed to 
introduce two new members of the USIC; the DNI; and DHS I&A. The 9/11 attacks on 
the U.S. served as a motivator for yet another national effort to protect the U.S. from both 





regarding a standard intelligence process is critical, since professional intelligence 
officers often think of their primary mission of information collection and analysis in 
terms of an “intelligence cycle.”76 
Historically, America has responded to the need for domestic intelligence in four 
ways. First, avoid it. There was less than a page-sized narrative devoted to intelligence in 
the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security. Second, construct ad-hoc 
arrangements without clear oversight and authority, which led to political abuse in the 
1975 Church Commission Report. Third, allow the FBI and CIA to perform limited and 
highly scrutinized overt domestic intelligence collection activities per EO 12333. Fourth, 
assume the law enforcement community can substitute for intelligence.77 
The National Network assumed a key role to address counterterrorism threat 
information sharing and intelligence analysis at the state and local level. The annual 
Fusion Center Assessments, a critical component of a broader Fusion Center Performance 
Program, is designed to measure pre-determined baseline capabilities and holistic 
performance of the National Network78 fulfilling the shortcomings identified in the 2010 
DHS BUR.  
The DHS, in coordination with interagency partners, Fusion Center Directors, and 
other fusion center stakeholders, manages the annual assessment process that focuses 
primarily on measuring four COCs,79 which contain elements of the intelligence cycle 
process model – collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. The 78 fusion 
centers that constitute the National Network completed the 2011 and 2012 Fusion Center 
Assessments allowing DHS to collect data necessary for measuring their progress in 
achieving baseline capabilities that include the COCs as key performance objectives 
within the National Network. 
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The first COC-1 is receive; the ability to receive classified and unclassified 
information from federal partners.80  The second COC-2 is analyze; the ability to assess 
local implications of threat information using a formal risk assessment process.81  The 
third COC-3 is disseminate; the ability to further disseminate threat information to other 
state, local, tribal, and territorial entities within their jurisdictions.82  And lastly, the 
fourth COC-4 is gather; the ability to gather locally generated information, aggregate it, 
analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate.83  The COCs 1 and 4 are 
viewed in context of the intelligence cycle process model pertaining to “collection” and 
places emphasis on the vertical flow of information among federal agencies and state, 
local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. As previously mentioned and reflected 
in Figure 1, the single common attribute within the various intelligence cycle models is 
the “collection” phase. Chapter III of this thesis offers noted historical and current 
challenges to executing domestic intelligence activities under the collection phase of the 
intelligence cycle process model, a continuing concern for privacy advocates. The COCs 
2 and 3 are logical sequenced actions of the intelligence cycle process model that are 
utterly contingent on the National Network’s ability to fully execute the complete 
intelligence cycle process. 
External to the National Network, DHS in close partnership with state and local 
partners developed the Target Capabilities List for general public safety officials, 
excluding law enforcement. The TCL describes the preparedness capabilities related to 
the four homeland security mission areas: Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover. The 
TCL identified critical elements of the intelligence cycle process model involved with 
gathering [collection], analysis, production and dissemination that states and localities 
should possess in order to prevent, protect, respond and recover from a terrorist incident. 
It defines and provides the basis for assessing preparedness of which include information 
gathering (collection), intelligence analysis and production as elements of the Prevent 
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Mission Capabilities. In 2009, the Heritage Foundation,84 which is a conservative think 
tank whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policy, emphasized 
the significance of state and local capabilities in understanding the threat environment 
reported in a article titled Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities 
Trump Federal Policy.  
B. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE POLICY 
The 2002 Homeland Security Act established DHS I&A, which was later 
amended by the 2007 Implementing Recommendations of the 911 Commission Act that 
established the DHS I&A State and Local Program Office. Both pieces of legislation 
created an organization designed to address the issues of information sharing to protect 
the homeland and partnering with state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector 
elements to ensure not only horizontal and vertical information sharing but also to 
leverage the HSE as contributors to the national intelligence architecture. Effective 
information sharing and the expansion of USIC capabilities is intended serve a more 
comprehensive approach in supporting the national efforts to protect the U.S. from future 
terrorist attacks. 
The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), signed 
into law by President Bush made major amendments to the 1947 National Security Act 
and reintroduced the  “…idea of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) [that] dates to 
1955 when a blue-ribbon study [was] commissioned by Congress. It was the attacks of 
September 11, however, that finally moved forward the longstanding call for major 
intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence.”85  As noted in 
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directions regarding “timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, 
plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents”86 in 
support of national security.  
An EO serves as an official document to manage the operations of the federal 
government.87  However, when EO 13470 in 2008 amended EO 12333, it included 
language focused on the responsibility of state, local and tribal governments, as well as 
the private sector to support U.S. intelligence activities. In order to support state, local 
and tribal governments, as well as the private sector integration into the HSE and support 
U.S. intelligence activities, DHS I&A, as well as other federal and academic elements, 
began delivering intelligence cycle process model training to the National Network and 
HSE. 
The single common attribute used by various USIC intelligence cycle models is 
the “collection” phase. Nonetheless, the intelligence collection phase under the 
intelligence cycle process model within the post-9/11 HSE is considered a gray area 
because information is often required or expected from activities that are not necessarily 
violations of law, yet the information may be collected for the purpose of predictive 
analytic assessments for law enforcement and homeland security professionals. In 1952, 
intelligence “collection” was defined as the procuring, assembling and organizing of 
information and served as the first step in the processing of intelligence information 
according to The International Dictionary of Intelligence published by author Leo D. 
Carl. Today, it is considered the third step or phase in the intelligence cycle and 
“officially defined as ‘the exploitation of sources of information by collection agencies 
and delivery of information to the proper intelligence-processing unit for use in the 
production of intelligence.’”88  The 1952 definition was geared toward intelligence 
collection targeted against communist nation-states of the former Soviet Union and not 
the domestic intelligence environment of today. 
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The September 11 terrorist attacks raised serious concerns regarding the 
sufficiency of the USIC intelligence collection capabilities and facilitated state, local, 
tribal and private sector partner assimilation into the newly established homeland security 
enterprise. The nation began focusing its intelligence collection efforts in order to prevent 
future attacks through the development of multiple national strategies between the White 
House and the DNI with minimal attention to domestic intelligence collection. The White 
House produced the 2002 National Security Strategy, the 2007 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, and the 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States, the 
2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy, and most recently the 2012 National Strategy 
for Information Sharing and Safeguarding. The DNI produced the 2005 National 
Intelligence Strategy and the 2009 National Counterintelligence Strategy. The first 
National Homeland Security Strategy published by the Bush administration in 2002 
documented “Homeland security is based on the principle of shared responsibility and 
partnership with “state and local governments, the private sector, and the American 
people.”89  However, within the 2002 national strategy, there is no specific mention of 
domestic intelligence collection,90 which remains consistent among the other referenced 
strategies.  
Executive Order (EO) 12333 provides guidance for U.S. intelligence activities 
among USIC members, but it lacks a specific doctrine or “how to” concerning domestic 
intelligence collection to prevent repeating the law enforcement and intelligence mishaps 
of the past. The lack of doctrine may accelerate intelligence mishaps given the explicit 
language of Part 1.4 of EO 12333 that integrates state, local, and tribal governments, as 
well as private sector entities. 
[T]he Intelligence Community shall collect and provide information in 
accordance with priorities set by the President concerning activities to 
protect against international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, intelligence activities directed against the United States, 
international criminal drug activities, and other hostile activities directed 
against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and 
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their agents as well as take into account information needs relating to 
national and homeland security provided by state, local, and tribal 
governments and private sector entities.91   
The federal government concentrates its support to nontraditional intelligence 
collectors (state, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector entities) via the 
National Network. The National Network is a far-reaching change from the USIC that 
existed originally as part of a massive response to the challenge from the Axis powers in 
World War II and charged with responding to the challenges associated with the spread 
of Communism and the military might of the Soviet Union.  
Most fusion centers within the National Network are law enforcement centric and 
recently integrated the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model as the standard intelligence 
business practice. The term “Intelligence-led Policing” was coined in Great Britain to 
focus on key criminal activities92 and its general philosophy was adopted by IACP in the 
March 2002 Intelligence Summit.93 Author and academic David Carter, stated the 
emergence of ILP significantly enhances the law enforcement intelligence function.94  
However, as law enforcement agencies wrestle with the understanding of their new role 
in collecting and analyzing intelligence in support of the national intelligence architecture 
while at the same time managing crime in their jurisdictions, some authors judge 
introduction of ILP in the U.S. has been problematic.95  Few agencies engage in proper 
intelligence-led techniques and ILP cannot be implemented effectively, if officers and 
analysts are not trained in the intelligence cycle process model in order to prevent crime 
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and terrorism.96  According to the 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report, 100 percent of the National Network reported conducting or contributing to threat 
assessments, primarily focused on consequence, risk or vulnerability analysis97 juxtapose 
proactively identifying threats supporting intelligence-led law enforcement activities 
necessary for preventing crime and terrorism. Purportedly, only 41 of 78 fusion centers 
(53.2 percent) contributed to national-level assessments, a statistic unchanged from the 
2011 Assessment. 
The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst 
(IALEIA), an organization established in 1980 to advance law enforcement intelligence 
analytic standards, defines ILP as “executive implementation of the intelligence cycle to 
support proactive decision making for resources allocation and crime prevention.”98  A 
consensus on the interpretation of the ILP philosophy between IACP and IALEIA has not 
been reached relative to standard employment of the intelligence cycle process model. 
C. EXPLOITING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES – ABUSES 
Expanding domestic intelligence capabilities initially began in the early part of 
the 20th century under President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration.99  Thirty-plus 
years prior to 9/11, challenges with domestic intelligence collection were uncovered 
during the 1970s Watergate, Rockefeller, Church, and Pike Investigations. The 
investigations involved overreach into U.S. domestic intelligence by the USIC and  
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improper domestic intelligence activities by the Law Enforcement Community.100  
However, September 11, 2001, once again initiated the demand for increased domestic 
intelligence collection. 
Domestic intelligence abuses may be viewed from two perspectives, political and 
multicultural. During the 1970s, the main topic of interest underlying the perceived threat 
to U.S. social structures centered on preventing the spread of communism by addressing 
perceived Soviet Union influence of social issues. In the post-9/11 environment, the topic 
centers on identifying the terrorist threat residing within the U.S. from groups or 
individuals aligned with radical violent and extremist ideology.  
D. USIC MEMBERS – FBI, CIA, AND DOD/NSA 
Members of the USIC, most notably the FBI and the CIA, as well as local law 
enforcement, conducted improper domestic intelligence collection activities under two 
programs. The FBI Counterintelligence Program known as COINTELPRO is well known 
for its domestic intelligence collection overreaches. The Center for National Security 
Studies,101 a civil liberties think-tank founded in 1974 to prevent violations of civil 
liberties in the U.S., published several articles on COINTELPRO. Another grim domestic 
intelligence overreach involved the CIA’s Operation CHAOS.102 
Seymour Hersh in the New York Times first exposed the CIA’s domestic 
operations on December 22, 1974. As a result, President Ford established the Rockefeller 
Commission to look into the CIA’s domestic intelligence activities. The Rockefeller 
Commission detailed the CIA’s mail intercept program described a separate domestic 
spying program run by the CIA’s Office of Security called Project Resistance and 
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mentioned an Office of Security program that gave seminars and training on lock-picking 
and surveillance to a number of local police departments. 
The CIA’s Operation CHAOS was designed to infiltrate American student 
organizations opposed to the Vietnam War to determine if there were foreign links.103  
The CIA Operation CHAOS existed for 5 years beginning in 1967 and ending in 1972, 
according to the Rockefeller report that revealed a compilation of some 13,000 different 
files, including files on 7,200 American citizens. However, the numbers may be on the 
low side; Operation CHAOS was tightly compartmented within the CIA and free from 
periodic internal review. For example, later reports of the number of state, local, and 
county police departments assisted by the CIA were put at 44, which is far more than the 
handful mentioned in the Rockefeller report. 
The problems of collection guidance were the subject of a number of special 
studies to include the CIA’s Inspector General in 1966 (known as the Cunningham 
Report).104  In wake of revelations that the CIA had violated its charter by spying on U.S. 
citizens, a series of congressional investigations concluded there were violations of the 
law, as well as discovery of much wider range of intelligence investigation abuses.105 
During the same period as CIA’s Operation CHAOS, the FBI’s COINTELPRO 
levied intelligence requirements on the CIA to collect information on U.S. citizens 
traveling abroad.106  The FBI, established in 1908, was initially designated primarily as a 
law enforcement agency. However, under President Roosevelt’s administration and 
because of World War II, the FBI’s responsibilities expanded to include centralizing the 
authority for domestic intelligence.107  Although originally created to investigate specific 
federal crimes, the FBI expanded into the notorious Hoover-era domestic intelligence 
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agency that was famous for excess and overreach. Revelations of Hoover-era abuses 
prompted the FBI to refocus for a time on crime solving and a season of robust oversight 
and operational limitations on intelligence gathering followed. These limits were set forth 
in an internal set of rules, known since their creation as the “Attorney General’s 
Guidelines.”108  The organizational setback is still a concern with the American public 
and civil liberties organizations. Because of 9/11, the Attorney General’s Guidelines have 
once again undergone changes and currently it is titled the Domestic Intelligence 
Operations Guide. Thus, while the FBI has conducted investigations for both law 
enforcement and intelligence purposes throughout its history, their intelligence-collection 
activities prompt the most frequent calls for reform.109   
During combat operations in Vietnam, U.S. Army intelligence agents gathered 
information on anti-war activists in support of the potential use of federal troops in the 
case of civil disturbances or urban riots. When the U.S. Army’s domestic intelligence 
program became public knowledge in 1970 the public and political backlash caused a 
sever reduction at the end of the Vietnam War at perceived abuses.110  The NSA, a DoD 
element recently came under public scrutiny concerning domestic intelligence collection 
activities. In the wake of leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, U.S. 
officials have faced growing questions about the kinds of information they are collecting 
about Americans, at what scale and under what authority. Intelligence officials reported 
collection efforts are important counterterrorism measures. Similar to the current privacy 
concerns regarding domestic intelligence collection activities by the FBI and the National 
Network, NSA has ties to past domestic intelligence collection abuses. The NSA created 
Project MINARET in 1969 to spy on peace groups and black power organizations. 
Federal agencies requested NSA to survey international communications of certain U.S. 
citizens traveling to Cuba. Beginning in 1967, requesting agencies provided names of 
U.S. persons in an effort to determine foreign influence on civil disturbances occurring 
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throughout the Nation and later, the widespread national concern over criminal activity 
such as drug trafficking and acts of terrorism, both domestic and international.111 
The activities were likely a result of the lack of specific legislative and 
organizational guidance or doctrine regarding domestic intelligence collection. The U.S. 
intelligence collection array was largely built to respond to the difficulties of penetrating 
the Soviet target.112 However, as the literature review highlights, when the collection 
phase on the USIC intelligence cycle is directed to support domestic intelligence, it has 
proved to be a detriment to civil rights without sound doctrine. 
E. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
As early as the 1920s, law enforcement intelligence units maintained “dossier” 
files on individuals thought to be involved in some form with criminal activity, and in the 
1950s, such files were maintained on individuals due to their political expressions or their 
placement on the fringes of mainstream society. Because of these files, the U.S. Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled state or local law enforcement might be 
subject to civil liability.  
This ruling commonly referred to as the “1983 suits” relied on a provision of the 
1871 Civil Rights Act, codified as U.S. Code Title 42, Section 1983 – Civil Action for 
Deprivation of Rights. In the 1960s and early 1970s, lawsuits under the “1983 suits” 
targeting police intelligence units provided an individual could hold state and local law 
enforcement departments and their officers liable for maintaining records on individuals 
with no evidence of a crime.113  Given a history in the 1960s and 1970s in which police 
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intelligence units all too often violated citizen groups’ First Amendment rights, there was 
a widespread movement to dismantle such capabilities.114 
The NCISP drafted by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
Intelligence Working Group served to provide a model for intelligence process principles 
and policies by law enforcement elements. A key element of the NCISP supports policies 
that will protect privacy and constitutional rights while not hindering the intelligence 
process. As an example, the NCISP states a “privacy policy should stress the need for and 
importance of planning and direction (the first stage of the intelligence process). 
Although it is only one phase of the intelligence cycle, planning and direction guides the 
overall activities of the criminal intelligence function.”115 
F. NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS 
The National Network is susceptible to encountering like challenges with 
executing domestic intelligence activities. In December 2007, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) published an article titled What’s Wrong With Fusion Centers?” 
in which authors Michael German, ACLU Senior Policy Counsel and former FBI 
Supervisory Special Agent and Jay Stanley, an ACLU Senior Policy Analyst claims there 
has not been adequate public discourse regarding the National Network establishment 
prior to opening a state or major urban area fusion center charged with collection and 
sharing of intelligence information, specifically about American citizens and other 
residents. The article emphasizes civil rights abuses of the past by federal and local law 
enforcement and intelligence organizations while concluding like actions could 
potentially occur again without the proper legislative oversight and adequate checks and 
balances to monitor their operations. 
The ACLU provided examples of a number of troubling intelligence products 
produced by fusion centers that were leaked to the public, such as a Texas fusion center 
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that released an intelligence bulletin describing a purported conspiracy between Muslim 
civil rights organizations, lobbying groups, the Iraq anti-war movement, a former U.S. 
Congresswoman, the U.S. Treasury Department and hip hop bands to spread Sharia law 
in the U.S. A Virginia Fusion Center reportedly issued a terrorism threat assessment 
describing the state’s universities and colleges as “nodes for radicalization” and 
characterized the “diversity” surrounding a Virginia military base and the state’s 
“historically black” colleges as possible threats.116 
G. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE - CULTURE 
As a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 2001 Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act also known as the USA PATRIOT Act, allowed greater latitude 
in domestic intelligence/law enforcement collection activities.117  The USA PATRIOT 
Act represents a decision on the part of the president and Congress that the nation expects 
its defenders to be proactive against terrorism of all kinds.118  In support of the proactive 
nature to defend the nation, DHS I&A has the responsibility per Section 503 of the 9/11 
Commission Act to develop training curricula on the intelligence cycle process model for 
state and local officials119 via the National Network in an effort to predict emerging 
threats.  
In order to fully execute the USIC intelligence cycle process model, information 
fusion as an immediate and long-term strategic capability must be continually built upon 
to perform carefully informed analysis and assessments of homeland security 
information. In order to achieve such a capability, government agencies and 
organizations must have timely and appropriate access to information that supports the 
“collection” phase of the intelligence cycle process model. This remains a challenge 
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within the HSIE, specifically DHS I&A, as reflected in the DOJ Opinion of 28 Code of 
Federal Regulations, Part 23 specifically pertaining to DHS I&A. The opinion revealed;  
It has been brought to [DOJ] attention that some elements of the law 
intelligence information (which may include ‘law enforcement sensitive’ 
information) with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), based 
upon a concern that it is not a ‘law enforcement activity.’  DOJ has 
consistently advised that the term does not require that an agency have law 
enforcement or investigative authority in order to qualify under an 
intelligence project’s ‘need to know’ and ‘right to know’ criteria. Based on 
the description above, it appears that DHS, in performing its function of 
gathering information needed to protect the nation from foreign or 
domestic terrorist activity, is engaged in a ‘law enforcement activity’ and 
accordingly may be given access to criminal intelligence information that 
may be needed to properly carry out that function.120 
The challenges with fusing information have been identified within HSIE as well 
as the HSE. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security reported under the 
heading Challenges in Homeland Security and Beyond “although we have substantially 
improved our cooperation and partnership among all levels of government, private and 
nonprofit sectors, communities, and individual citizens, we must continue to strengthen 
efforts to achieve full unity of effort through a stronger and further integrated national 
approach to homeland security. Our information sharing capabilities have improved 
significantly, but substantial obstacles remain. We must continue to break down 
information barriers among federal, state, local and tribal partners and the private 
sector.”121 
In early August 2010, President Obama signed EO 13549 titled Classified 
National Security Information Programs for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector 
(SLTPS) Entities. This represented a significant step forward to facilitate classified 
intelligence and homeland security-related information sharing with SLTPS partners; to 
include putting in place a governance and oversight structure that would serve to ensure 
the uniform application of security standards within the executive branch and SLTPS 
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communities while maintaining consistency with existing policy and standards. This 
action now allowed classified information originating outside of DHS, and not otherwise 
covered by specific memorandum of understandings, to be disseminated by DHS to 
appropriately cleared nonfederal recipients in the National Network. 
However, the policy and associated information sharing strategies often set forth 
by Washington are not readily accepted as they promulgate outside Washington, DC. In a 
professional environment, the writer observed and experienced unsuccessful intelligence 
and information sharing between SLTPS nontraditional intelligence recipients and federal 
HSIE and USIC entities because of differing organizational cultures. Due to the typical 
law enforcement culture and “lead-agency” law enforcement concept, the sharing of 
information with nontraditional law enforcement partners and the private sector remains a 
challenge. The October 2010 DHS Office of Inspector General Report emphasized this 
premise when it reported, “despite the overall improvements, DHS continues to face 
several information sharing challenges. Specifically, DHS component collaboration in the 
information sharing process needs improvement. In addition, unfinished intelligence 
products have not always been timely, and the production process for finished 
intelligence products should allow for more fusion center collaboration.”122   
The intelligence cycle process model collection phase depends on effective 
information sharing in order to produce value-added finished intelligence products for 
HSE policy and decision makers. With the expansion of USIC capabilities via SLTPS 
partners in support of the national intelligence effort, it is difficult to evaluate its 
effectiveness of the intelligence cycle process model in context of the lack of consistent 
intelligence cycle training and employment. Ms. Lisa Palmieri, a current DHS I&A 
Senior Intelligence Officer and former President of the International Association of Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, suggests the analysis phase of the intelligence cycle 
process model is problematic given the confusion between the terms intelligence and 
information among law enforcement officials as well as “…agencies employment of so-
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called analysts who were either unaware of or untrained in analysis and who were merely 
collecting and disseminating raw data.”123 
Mr. Matt Mayer, counselor to the Secretary and Acting Executive Director for the 
Office of Grants and Training in DHS, visiting fellow at The Heritage Foundation, and 
President of the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions in Columbus, Ohio and Mr. 
Scott Erickson, who has studied and written on the proliferation of homegrown terrorism 
and the response by domestic law enforcement have specifically addressed the need for 
reform within the law enforcement culture in order to properly support their new 
counterterrorism role. Both assert that “uniformity of training must be a central aspect of 
any comprehensive shift in the domestic law enforcement culture” and “maintaining a 
mixed counterterrorism training regime [that includes the application of intelligence 
analysis] across the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies will inhibit the adoption of 
consistent and uniform standards for counterterrorism recognition and awareness.”  
Symmetrical and uniform training standards would benefit the broader law enforcement 
community, as well as the public at large, by ensuring a consistent understanding of the 
threat of terrorism.124 
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IV. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL CASE STUDY – 
BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
No one can comprehend what goes on under the sun. Despite all their 
efforts to search it out, no one can discover its meaning. Even if the wise 
claim they know, they cannot really comprehend it. Ecclesiastes 8:17 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an evaluation of performance metrics known as COCs for the National 
Network, the TCL for non-law enforcement elements, such as emergency managers, and 
the MCCCIE for the law enforcement community, this thesis intends to ascertain 
adherence to the intelligence cycle process model. To better understand the intelligence 
cycle process model’s general effectiveness, the thesis examines existing public data 
made available to the author of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing with respect to the 
National Network and HSE. Information made available regarding the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing will attempt to illuminate whether the National Network or the HSE 
adhered to the intelligence cycle process model in order to forecast or prevent the terrorist 
act. 
The Boston Marathon bombing once again raised similar questions that surfaced 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks regarding law enforcement officials and 
intelligence analysts’ ability to identify a potential terrorist attack. The Boston Marathon 
bombing serves as a platform to discuss the effective employment of the intelligence 
cycle process model by the National Network, and why it did not prevent the Boston 
bombing. This associated case study is intended to underscore key issues associated with 
employing the intelligence cycle process model at the state and local level by 
demonstrating its effectiveness prior to, during, and after the April 15, 2013, Boston 
Marathon bombing as an appropriate HSE intelligence process model. It is not focused on 
identifying possible solutions and providing potential courses of action. The case study 
framework and lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bombing may be useful to 
HSE agencies in developing and supporting intelligence processes suitable for the 
National Network. The information sources gathered for this case study were acquired 
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from public discussion of the issue in Congress, court documents, the press media and 
statements of senior state and local officials. 
This case study uses the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing in the context 
of the intelligence cycle process model adherence necessary to detect the threat and 
provide intelligence to policy and decision makers with information in order to prevent 
the bombing. Additionally, the case study highlights the challenges with implementing 
the intelligence cycle process model within the National Network while ensuring security 
and safety from both domestic and international terrorism. Literature has highlighted the 
challenges with the intelligence cycle process model within the U.S. intelligence 
community, as well as the HSIE and HSE, and how difficult it is to lead a successful 
intelligence process to the point that a value-added intelligence product is produced with 
sufficient content and consensus to be useful to the organizations tasked to develop it. 
This is especially true in a National Network that lack the mature culture and uniform 
repeatable processes generally employed by organizations like those that comprise the 
17-member USIC. Nonetheless, intelligence as an entity, process, and product within the 
HSE has the critical mission of preventing future terrorist attacks. 
Using the intelligence cycle process model domestically to support the HSE in an 
attempt to think ahead and to understand what is going to happen in the future has 
reopened old wounds associated with abuse of power by law enforcement and 
intelligence entities. Instead of having to focus on domestic intelligence collection in an 
effort to identify state actors of foreign intelligence and security services as a result of 
Cold War labors, it is now necessary that intelligence collection must expand beyond the 
traditional USIC members in order to defeat terrorism and transnational criminal 
organization threats in a post-9/11 environment.  
The National Network was another safeguard developed across the country since 
9/11 to support the national intelligence architecture and prevent future terrorist attacks. 
They were expressly created to make sure law-enforcement agencies shared terrorist-
related information developed by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. “It 
highlights a concern that we have and the need for agencies to share data on the subjects 
that they are investigating,” said Mike Sena, president of the National Fusion Center 
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Association.125  DHS estimates it has pumped $1.4 billion into state and local fusion 
centers in their effort to support the National Network and assist with sharing intelligence 
and treat information necessary to prevent terror attacks across the country.126 
The implementation of the intelligence cycle process model within the USIC, 
HSIE and HSE in order to determine its effectiveness has received mixed reviews. Given 
these interpretations, the Boston Marathon bombing will be used to assess the 
effectiveness of a six-step intelligence cycle process that embraces Intelligence Analysis: 
A Target-Centric Approach published in 2004 by author Robert M. Clark: 1) 
Requirements, needs, 2) Planning, direction, 3) Collection, 4) Processing, 5) Analysis, 
and 6) Dissemination.127 
B. SCENARIO 
On April 15, 2013, at 2:49 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, two pressure cooker 
bombs exploded during the Boston Marathon killing three people and injuring 264 others.  
The suspects were identified later that day as Dzhokar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev.128  
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was subsequently killed by law enforcement, but Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
while injured was able to escape. On April 19, 2013, during an unprecedented manhunt 
by thousands of law enforcement officers, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was later captured and 
arrested.  
C. PHASE 1 – REQUIREMENTS/NEEDS 
The beginning of the intelligence cycle process model is identifying information 
needs/requirements from a defined customer base with the intent of providing the right 
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intelligence product to the right end user to prevent future terrorist attacks. Homeland 
Security Standing Information Needs (HSEC SINs) form the foundation for information 
collection activities within the National Network to focus their collection, analytic, and 
reporting assets in support of the homeland security mission.129 
There existed HSEC SINs made available to the National Network and the HSIE 
to identify and document information needs designed to prevent the Boston Marathon 
bombing. Additionally, in 2004 DHS issued a warning regarding explosive devices 
hidden in pressure cookers.130  Likewise, according to a July 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate entitled The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland an attack like the Boston 
bombing has been a concern for the U.S. government for years.131  The DHS warning 
indicated pressure cooker bombs was as “a technique commonly taught in Afghan 
terrorist training camps.”132 
The Boston Regional Intelligence Center and the Commonwealth Fusion Center 
in Maynard,133 which were designed to serve as clearinghouses for information about 
potential threats, were unaware that the FBI interviewed Tsarnaev as part of a three-
month investigation after Russian agents alerted U.S. officials to his increasing 
radicalization, officials said.134  Nor was information about Tsarnaev shared at the 
quarterly meetings the FBI had with local law enforcement leaders because according to 
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the FBI, it did not rise to a specific level of concern.135  “We were not privy to the tip,’’ 
said David Procopio, the spokesman for the Massachusetts State Police, which oversees 
the Fusion Center, “They didn’t share that information with us.”136 
The numbers of HSE nontraditional intelligence recipients are vast, including the 
78 fusion centers that make up the National Network. Due to the enormous number of 
executives charged with establishing and implementing intelligence policy, two 
challenges are immediately discovered; who determines the requirement to have access to 
intelligence and information together with identifying who shoulders the responsibility of 
approving and establishing the priorities for satisfying documented intelligence needs. 
The National Network is unlike the USIC that can be task members to collect, analyze 
and produce national intelligence products by Intelligence Community Directives and 
Intelligence Community Policy Guidance. 
Within Phase 1 of the intelligence cycle process model, it appears clear that the 
DHS HSEC SINs provided the necessary information needs (requirements) to the 
National Network in an effort to focus their assets on reporting potential terrorist activity 
in support of the homeland security mission. Nevertheless, the National Network does not 
have an executive body capable of issuing directives to state and local owned fusion 
centers that serve their respective jurisdictions.  
D. PHASE 2 – PLANNING/DIRECTION 
In an April 2009 statement by John E. Bateman, Assistant Commander, Texas 
Department of Public Safety to the Committee on House Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, he 
commented that the National Network was designed to be a network of multi-agency 
intelligence centers, sharing and analyzing information, and then passing that information 
on to decision makers and first line personnel in the field, allowing these groups to make 
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better, more informed decisions as they work to thwart the individuals and groups 
intended to harm the U.S. While there have been, in the past, multi-agency taskforce 
operations on the enforcement side designed to address problems relating to crime and 
terrorism, the National Network is the first true comprehensive nationwide program to 
combine the analytical and informational capabilities of federal, state, county, local, and 
tribal agencies.137   
The planning/direction phase of the intelligence cycle process model at the federal 
level is generally administered by the DNI and the respective USIC organization. 
However, within the National Network, there does not exist a centralized element to 
oversee the administration of this process. Although there existed HSEC SINs focused on 
preventing terrorist attacks, Senator Joseph Lieberman asked, “did the FBI enlist the help 
of state and local law enforcement, either on or off the JTTF to continue to watch the 
brothers, engage with their friends, associates and community leaders or monitor their 
Internet activities – including Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s YouTube account, which openly 
recommended a collection of jihadist videos – for the purpose of assessing if either or 
both of the brothers were radicalizing”?  Senator Lieberman commented the FBI does not 
have the resources or personnel to monitor all potential terrorist threats in this country 
and must rely on state and local law enforcement.138 
The cultural and legal barriers to effective partnerships among national 
intelligence elements and the National Network prevent effective planning/direction 
within the HSE and the new national intelligence structure. The final report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
described many instances in which, in the period leading up to September 11, 2001 
potentially useful information was available but no one knew to ask for it, information 
was distributed only in compartmented channels, or information was requested but 
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withheld on the basis of a determination that it could not be shared. Twelve years later, 
Congressional House and Senate members have identified similar challenges remain with 
threat notification, access to information, and database management of information that 
may have contributed the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. 
E. PHASE 3 – COLLECTION 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security supports the collection of 
information resulting in actionable intelligence for law enforcement agencies to prevent 
terrorist attacks. The collection of this information combines state and local criminal 
intelligence and national intelligence. Historically, domestic intelligence collection is 
viewed as problematic for law enforcement criminal intelligence when American law 
enforcement agencies have three primary roles: 1) Solving crimes committed in the past, 
2) Preventing crimes that are imminent, and 3) Collecting criminal intelligence to stop 
future crimes.  
Law enforcement criminal intelligence collection is guided by 28 CFR Part 23. 28 
CFR Part 23 requires the collection and maintenance of criminal intelligence information 
concerning an individual, only if there is reasonable suspicion or criminal predicate that 
the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity, and only if the information is 
relevant to that criminal conduct or activity. Because the “reasonable suspicion or 
criminal predicate” thresholds may be both conjectural and subjective in nature, criminal 
intelligence information cannot be accessed by criminal suspects to verify that the 
information is accurate and complete. The protections and limitations set forth in 28 CFR 
Part 23 are necessary to protect the privacy interests of the subjects and potential subjects 
of a criminal intelligence system.139 
The FBI said it took a number of investigative steps to check on the request, 
including looking at his travel history, checking databases for derogatory information and 
searching for Web postings. Agents also interviewed Tsarnaev’s family members, the 
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FBI said, but did not detect terrorist activity.140  Richard Falkenrath, an adjunct Senior 
Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, claim the U.S. authorities support 
broadminded foreign intelligence-gathering techniques abroad while, “we’re instead 
reliant on more restricted domestic intelligence techniques to identify terrorist before they 
attack.”141 
Although the FBI and CIA as USIC members conducted a collection of 
information to determine the threat, a spokeswoman for the Boston Police Department 
said the Boston Regional Intelligence Center also was never notified about the FBI 
investigation142 that may have resulted in the ability to leverage state and local unique 
capabilities to collect valuable data. In the FBI’s final analysis, it concluded there was 
little it could have done to prevent the Boston Marathon bombing due to constraints 
provided in federal law and Justice Department protocols.143  Although federal-level 
protocols disallowed the FBI from further inquiry, the National Network was also 
prevented from serving as a force-multiplier in an effort to collect as much information as 
possible in determining the threat. 
While collection is the common variable among various intelligence cycle process 
models, it is also the most challenging to accomplish given the history of domestic 
intelligence collection activities by federal agencies and local law enforcement. Within 
the National Network, collection is implied to address “all-threats,” but state and local 
organizational policies are generally unclear on what information is to be collected and 
what collection techniques is to be used, notwithstanding explicit statements to protect 
privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. 
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F. PHASE 4 – PROCESSING 
The processing of information associated with the Boston Marathon bombing in 
the context of the intelligence cycle process model proved ineffective because of 
information sharing challenges and data overload. A FBI Supervisory Agent provided an 
emailed statement suggesting that state and local officials had ample access to 
information about the Tsarnaev investigation in 2011, through their participation on the 
FBI Boston JTTF144 that include detectives and detective supervisors from the Boston 
Regional Intelligence Center. Additionally, the Boston Police Department maintains a 
close and ongoing working relationship with both the FBI and DHS through the 
intelligence personnel both agencies have assigned to work within the fusion center.145  
While fusion center (National Network) personnel are employed on the FBI Boston 
JTTF, what has surfaced is that the information was compartmentalized to a point it 
provided a barrier and prevented a timely notification of potential threat information and 
intelligence to senior state and local decision makers.  
An added challenge to processing information for determining an intelligence 
value is data overload. Richard DesLauriers, head of FBI Boston stated the FBI’s 
assessment of Tsarnaev was “…one of about 1,000 such assessments conducted by the 
Boston task force…”146 leading up to the Boston Marathon bombing. In relation to the 
processing of information associated with the Boston Marathon bombing, congressional 
members evoke many of the same themes associated with September 11, 2001. 
Representative Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, 
declared “My fear is that the Boston bombers may have succeeded because our system  
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failed,”147 and Representative Bernie Thompson announced “We cannot ignore that once 
again it has taken a tragedy to reveal problems in our vast, varied and numerous federal 
databases.”148 
G. PHASE 5 – ANALYSIS 
Analysis in many respects is as difficult to attain as the collection aspect. One 
critical challenge is the intergroup dynamics between law enforcement investigators and 
intelligence analysts. Ms. Lisa Palmeiri, noted law enforcement is undergoing a real 
transformation and recognizing that intelligence is different from simple information as 
police executives have recognized only a clear comprehension of the analytic process will 
support public safety officials in protecting the nation.149  Boston’s Commissioner 
Edward Davis stated his detectives may have concluded the same findings as the FBI in 
that there was no information (back then) that would have caused further investigation of 
the Tsarnaev’s.150  What is not stressed in both the FBI findings and the Boston 
Commissioner’s statement is the skill-set and analytic tradecraft employed by supporting 
analysts. This issue is compounded when dealing with the associated challenges of 
intelligence management, as well as interagency intelligence collaboration. As an 
example, how do you effectively balance the demands of current real-time crime 
intelligence needs and the competing demands for longer-range predictive analysis?   
A 2011 The Homeland Security Policy Institute’s Counterterrorism Intelligence 
Survey Research report, indicated 62 percent of the intelligence chiefs representing major 
metropolitan police departments in the U.S. believed the “national [federal] intelligence 
enterprise was such that it left them unable to develop a complete understanding of their 
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local threat environment.”151  Likewise, in the September 2011 Intelligence and National 
Security Alliance publication, experts agree that many federal intelligence and law 
enforcement professionals do not recognize the homeland security implications and 
intricacies of criminal information.152 
Without the information possessed by FBI Boston, the Boston Regional 
Intelligence Center analysts were never in a position to help federal authorities connect 
the dots on a potentially dangerous person. They could not evaluate the relevance of 
Tsarnaev’s six-month trip to Russia in 2012; assess whether his potentially extremist 
views may have further hardened after he returned to his home in Cambridge; or decide 
whether authorities needed to interview him again.153 
In hindsight to the Boston Marathon bombings, the DNI as part of a full 
interagency review ordered a review and assessment now under way by the U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement community. The initial intelligence review had focused 
largely on regional militant connections the men had in Russia or Central Asia. Initially, 
before the FBI identified the men, the review was looking at any indications of a threat 
emerging from overseas against the U.S. Once the identities of the men became known, 
with their possible ethnic Chechen background, the focus shifted. The USIC is tasked 
under the review with checking any intelligence gathered overseas while the FBI will 
focus on what is known inside the United States.154  As part of the great HSE, the 
National Network has not been revealed as an element of the review, or the significant 
role it may have played in preventing the bombing.  
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H. PHASE 6 – DISSEMINATION 
The dissemination of a possible intelligence product may have centered on the 
differences in the understanding of what was identified as “intelligence” necessary for 
sharing information associated with the Boston Marathon bombing. The general 
inclination among law enforcement practitioners is that intelligence is information that 
leads to successful law enforcement activities. Within this context, the FBI Boston JTTF 
may have arrived at the conclusion there was no need to share information regarding the 
bombers. The USIC however, describes intelligence as information that has undergone a 
formal process, typically using a variation of the intelligence cycle process model. 
According to a U.S. official familiar with intelligence information on the Boston 
Marathon bombings, initial indications were that the two suspects do not have direct links 
to any major al Qaeda group or affiliates, or to a new significant terrorist threat to the 
U.S.155  Equally within the context of statement of the U.S. official, the intelligence 
information referenced was not provided to the National Network, specifically the Boston 
Regional Intelligence Center. 
The National Network, specifically the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, was 
not in a position to publish an intelligence product identifying concerns and issuing a 
warning regarding explosive devices hidden in pressure cookers. There is no available 
public literature or empirical data supporting the use of the intelligence cycle process 
model associated with information processing was used in respect to producing 
indications, watch and warnings intelligence in an effort to prevent the Boston Marathon 
bombing. The issues associated with the adherence of the intelligence cycle process 
model underscore the challenges that remain within the National Network relative to the 
effectiveness of the intelligence cycle process model. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The writer’s analysis of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing offers the National 
Network nor the HSE adhered entirely to the intelligence cycle process model in order to 
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forecast or prevent the terrorist act. This type of event was forecasted nine years earlier in 
2004 when DHS issued a issued a warning regarding explosive devices hidden in 
pressure cookers, also there existed HSEC SINs to identify and document relevant 
information needs. In addition, a National Intelligence Estimate entitled The Terrorist 
Threat to the U.S. Homeland was issued in July 2007 designating an attack like the 
Boston bombing was a concern for the U.S. government.156   
The writer identified several key issues underscored in the April 15, 2013, Boston 
Marathon bombing associated with employing the intelligence cycle process model at the 
state and local level as an appropriate HSE intelligence cycle process model. Adherence 
to the intelligence cycle process model revealed its ineffectiveness due to delays in access 
to relevant information between the FBI and local law enforcement. Recognizing that 
successful counterterrorism efforts require effective information sharing, Section 1016 of 
the 2004 IRTPA (Public Law 108–458), building on the August 27, 2004, EO 13356, 
“Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,” required the 
creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) for terrorism information. What 
also emerges is the challenge of identifying and prioritizing to whom and what 
information is to be shared by agencies within the HSE that supports the 
requirements/needs process. 
The 9/11 Commission Report that described instances leading up to September 
11, 2001, clearly reflected that potentially useful information was available, but no one 
knew to ask for it; information was distributed only in compartmented channels, or 
information was requested but withheld on the basis of a determination that it could not 
be shared. Each challenge is linked to effective adherence of the intelligence cycle 
process model, specifically planning and direction (Phase 2), collection (Phase 3), 
processing (Phase 4) and analysis (Phase 5) within the National Network and in this case 
similar to the Boston Marathon bombing. This exposes the continued need to address the  
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ISE designed to support sharing and access to terrorism information, including 
information from the intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, and 
other communities.  
Individual departments and agencies have their own policies and procedures for 
information sharing, but there is no single government-wide agreement on what 
constitutes appropriate information sharing. Different standards exist among agencies 
(and even within agencies) for the designation and dissemination of terrorism 
information, resulting in different views on who requires the information and when and 
how the information is needed and processed. Because information protection standards 
vary, decisions on reconciling the need to protect information and the need to share 
information have been inconsistent and have contributed to the creation of cultures that  
support information segregation. A fundamental change must occur so that, in the 
dynamic setting of the new ISE, the right information is available to the right people at 
the right time.157 
Consistent with the work of the Information Systems Council under Section 5 of 
EO 13356, one of the ISE’s goals is to remove technology as a barrier to improved 
information sharing. For the most part, the technology needed to improve interoperability 
and information sharing is available today; and it should be an enabler rather than a 
barrier. While it is true that users face a vast and confusing array of systems, databases, 
networks and tools, in most cases this vast and confusing array is caused not by 
technological barriers, but by the policies, protocols, and sometimes security and legal 
concerns that prevent us from connecting the systems and sharing information in an 
optimal way.158 
An area that remains to be developed is an appropriate identity-based screening 
system, to include biometrics and an improved visa threat analysis system. Law 
enforcement agencies have had to rely more on traditional investigative techniques to 
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detect terrorist travel concerns, which resulted in the arrest of two U.S. citizens in New 
York after allegations they planned to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.159  The lack 
of a direct mechanism to share terrorism-related information between law enforcement 
agencies, along with the sheer amount of data that a JTTF in a major city has to sort 
through, are two issues that should be addressed in light of these attacks.  
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V. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL AND THE 
HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE AND EMPLOYING THE 
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL 
Intelligence can no longer be defined in the context of ascertaining the capabilities 
and intentions of other nation-states abroad while systemically providing access to such 
intelligence to only an elite community of federal level intelligence analyst and 
collectors. The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought the intelligence function and the associated 
intelligence cycle process model to the forefront of the HSE. The post-9/11 HSE requires 
an intelligence cycle process model with the capability to operationalize intelligence gaps 
necessary for preventing terrorist acts from international terrorist groups operating abroad 
and within U.S. borders, domestic terrorist groups and homegrown violent extremists. It 
also requires providing timely results of intelligence cycle process model information 
(intelligence) to federal, state, and local customers. It is essential that officials responsible 
for the various aspects of homeland security fully realize the robust capacity of the 
national intelligence architecture. The U.S. government has the responsibility to dutifully 
and deliberately consider the Nation’s approach and actions given the complexity and 
uniqueness of operating within the domestic intelligence realm.160 
In order to maximize the capabilities of the HSE, the intelligence cycle process 
should address both a dynamic “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach as a contributor to 
the national intelligence architecture. The USIC traditional intelligence cycle process 
model is a “top-down” approach that was originally constructed to addresses military and 
national policy maker information needs. National policymakers requested information 
and assessments concerning foreign capabilities and threats and their potential to affect 
U.S. interests abroad, as well as U.S. preparations for defeating military foreign threats. 
A “bottom-up” approach to the intelligence cycle process model provides state and local 
decision makers, public safety officials and the private sector the ability to influence and 
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shape national interest through fusion centers operating within the National Network at 
the state and local level. There exists a credible need for a new intelligence process model 
that integrates the post-9/11 HSE and with it a need to train these diverse groups. 
Developing an intelligence process that integrates both, a “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
approach provides a comprehensive evaluation of the threats to homeland security that 
affect all levels of government and engages multiple public safety disciplines. 
B. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL TRAINING 
Members of the USIC have developed organizational institutions to train its 
intelligence elements on the intelligence cycle process model most fitting their 
organization. The CIA has the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis that 
provides specialized training in the craft of intelligence analysis.161  In 2005, the FBI 
established the Intelligence Career Service comprised of intelligence analysts, language 
specialists and surveillance specialists personnel with intelligence training at the College 
of Analytical Studies. It was later changed to the Center for Intelligence Training to 
provided basic and advanced training for FBI analysts and agents.162  The Department of 
Defense provides intelligence training via individual service institutions and jointly 
through the National Intelligence University located within the Defense Intelligence 
Analysis Center that focuses on the profession of intelligence and offers an in-depth 
curriculum intended to enhance the analytical skills and competencies of intelligence 
analysis.163  The DHS I&A Training Branch established the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Training Center to strengthen DHS intelligence enterprise capabilities, 
enhance collaboration among the intelligence offices of the department’s components, 
and provide specialized intelligence training to state and local officials.164  
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The DHS also supports formal degree granting opportunities with tailored 
intelligence instruction through the Naval Postgraduate School – Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security. 
In October 2007, the DOJ Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
commonly referred to as Global, published the Minimal Criminal Intelligence Training 
Standards for Law Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United 
States. Global serves as a federal advisory committee to the U.S. Attorney General on 
critical justice information sharing initiatives.165  The Global training philosophy is 
intended to “…develop a culture of information analysis and information sharing within 
the law enforcement communities…”166 Global defines the intelligence cycle as “an 
organized process by which information is gathered, assessed and distributed in order to 
fulfill the goals of the intelligence function. It is a method of performing analytic 
activities and placing the analysis in a usable form.”167 
Global identified objectives for law enforcement intelligence analyst, intelligence 
managers/commanders, executives, and officers. Within these objectives is a standard for 
training the intelligence process/cycle that includes topics to be considered: Collection, 
analysis, dissemination, production, collation, evaluation, and assessment within a three-
hour block of instruction for law enforcement analysts and managers.168  The law 
enforcement officer basic criminal intelligence officer provides for 40-minutes of training 
to include the officer’s role and responsibilities in the intelligence process/cycle.169  
Global does not identify sequential steps common within the USIC nor provide 
illustrations of the intelligence cycle. 
Though HSE partners, specifically state and local officials, have limited 
opportunities to attend in-residence training opportunities at the USIC member 
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institutions, there are far more intelligence focused training opportunities presented to 
state and local officials through on-site mobile training events sponsored by a number of 
elements. Through the DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and 
Services, DHS FEMA sponsored MIPT and the Institute of Intergovernmental Research 
delivers on-site mobile training opportunities to the National Network, as well as the state 
and local members of the HSE. In order to effect the required change, some have opined 
the need to establish as national center for intelligence training in conjunction with a 
national intelligence strategy. Although a national center has not been established, the 
Governor of Texas designated the Texas Department of Public Safety, Intelligence and 
Counter-Terrorism Division (DPS-ICT) as the proponent for intelligence for the State of 
Texas. The DPS-ICT, in concert with criminal justice professors at Texas State 
University, has initiated a project intended to create a certification program providing 
statewide training and an education baseline for all analysts in Texas.170  While many 
have echoed the sentiment regarding specific intelligence training to state and local law 
enforcement, there has been little realization of the kind of training that state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement communities need to be truly effective homeland security 
partners.171 
The need for integration of the state and local environment into nation’s 
intelligence effort was a principal finding of the USIC assessments in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks and desired goals of subsequent national strategies. In addition to the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the 2004 IRTPA provided the DNI and is responsible for establishing 
intelligence community-wide policies. Yet, there remain challenges and practical 
implementation with the intelligence cycle process model and domestic intelligence 
collection by the HSE, as noted in the previous chapter. It is critical to recognize and 
define how the USIC intelligence cycle process model is to be employed within the HSE 
at the state and local level. Equally significant is ascertaining if a standardized 
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intelligence cycle process model exists that is capable of being employed effectively 
within the USIC, the HSIE, as well as the HSE. As noted in previous chapters, there are 
many versions of the intelligence cycle process model that is generally aligned to an 
organizations’ mission space and numerous intelligence training venues theoretically 
serving to provide some aspect of training on the intelligence cycle. 
C. STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY 
A key element of the HSE is the state and local law enforcement community. 
Intelligence in law enforcement has historically been misunderstood, underutilized, and 
even misapplied. With 18,000 local and state law enforcement agencies in the U.S., there 
is a critical need to provide and coordinate education, training, and professional services 
related to domestic intelligence collection activities and the employment of a 
standardized intelligence cycle process model. There are many misconceptions about the 
meaning and application of intelligence within law enforcement, although the IACP 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan provides “intelligence is the combination of credible 
information with quality analysis - information that has been evaluated and from which 
conclusions can be drawn.172   
Ms. Lisa Palmieri suggests the intelligence cycle process model is not fully 
explored in the law enforcement community within the context of criminal investigations 
because case information collected during an investigation is often considered “peripheral 
to proving the elements of the crime.”  Additionally, Ms. Palmeiri claims the training of 
law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts has not been institutionalized 
necessary for incorporating “intelligence as an element of policing culture [that] would 
address the challenge of evaluating intelligence analysts in police agencies.”173 
Various reports identify more than 800,00 law enforcement officials nationwide 
responsible for public safety. Being able to provide intelligence products that support 
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more than 800,000 state and local law enforcement officials and the private sector 
requires a new approach to the intelligence cycle process model. Given the 18,000 state 
and local law enforcement agencies operating within the HSE, and the misconceptions 
about intelligence, the type of products disseminated generally fails to satisfy varied and 
numerous customer needs.  
In the 1970s, standards were introduced requiring police departments to articulate 
“criminal predicate” before beginning intelligence operations on members of the 
community. In the 1980s, the Regional Information Sharing System was established and 
implemented through the Criminal Intelligence Operating Policies at the federal level - 28 
CFR Part 23.174  A noticeable distinction exposes the current USIC intelligence cycle 
process model in that it does not require criminal predicate, on the other hand, 28 CFR 
Part 23 does not address the collection of information for policymakers, yet both are in 
use within the HSE in support of domestic intelligence collection activities.  
Police officers’ and sheriff’s believe that in order to be effective in preventing 
terrorism and related criminal activity; it is essential that they fully participate in the 
intelligence cycle process at both the federal and nonfederal levels. Additionally, they 
must become advocates for law enforcement intelligence products that meet their 
information needs and ensure law enforcement intelligence and other information is 
shared with their communities.175  The current USIC intelligence cycle process model 
paradigm fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering. It anticipates the threat before 
it arises and plans preventive action against suspected targets. In contrast, the law  
 
 
enforcement paradigm fosters reactions to information provided voluntarily, uses ex post 
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facto arrests and trials governed by the rule of law, rules of evidence, and the protection 
of the rights of American citizens.176   
Although law enforcement agencies need background information or “strategic 
intelligence” regarding patterns of criminal activity (e.g., analysis indicating that 
increasing quantities of cocaine are flowing through harbors in southern Florida), they 
tend to give higher priority to tactical information (e.g., a tip that a specific cargo vessel 
is scheduled to off-load a shipment of cocaine at a specific dock in Miami on the night of 
August 4). However, national policymakers require a continuous stream of information 
about countries, groups, and individuals working against U.S. interests. There is no end-
point to these requirements; even a favorable evolution of events does not mean the end 
of the need for up-to-date information. In many cases at the federal level, the need for 
intelligence is more important than the need for dealing with a particular incident. 
D. PRIVATE SECTOR 
In addition to the National Network, primarily supported by state and local law 
enforcement, there is a philosophy to integrate and maintain relationships with the private 
sector to support the needs of the national intelligence architecture. The are 15 private 
sectors Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) considered operational 
organizations that collect, analyze, and share threat and vulnerability information to 
protect critical infrastructure.177  These private sector elements with specialized 
capabilities can and are being used to address national security concerns and homeland 
security threat issues. These ISACs178 are: the Communications ISAC; the Electric Sector 
ISAC; the Emergency Services ISAC; the Financial Services ISAC; the National Health 
ISAC; the Information Technology ISAC; the Multi-State ISAC; the Maritime Security 
ISAC; the Nuclear Energy Institute; the Public Transportation ISAC; the Surface 
Transportation ISAC; the Real Estate ISAC; the Research and Education ISAC; the 
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Supply Chain ISAC; and the Water ISAC, all of which enhance information sharing and 
serve as analytic centers within the private sector.  
With the integration of private sector elements into the HSE and their value-added 
to information sharing, questions arise as to the intelligence cycle process model being 
trained by the elements mentioned previously. The success of U.S. intelligence at home 
will increasingly depend on a new form of domestic intelligence collection against 
specific threats and on the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation, from 
local law enforcement to the private sector.179    
Within the governance structure of the National Network, the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers provides fusion centers 
“shall have a governance structure that provides appropriate representation for the 
jurisdictions and disciplines in the center’s area of responsibility,” and as an example it 
reflects “including representatives from…the Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers…” in support of Fusion Center Guidelines 3, 4, and 5.180  In highlighting the role 
of fusion centers in national security, DHS posits “The national security enterprise must 
reach beyond the capabilities of the federal government and national intelligence 
community to identify and warn about impending plots that could impact the homeland, 
particularly when the individuals responsible for the threats operate within the United 
States and do not travel or communicate with others overseas.”181  Given DHS I&A’s 
responsibilities as a USIC member, it has the largest customer set than any other 
intelligence community member. 
This thesis summarizes there are no fewer than an estimated 175 federal, state, 
local law enforcement, and private sector establishments contributing to the responsibility 
for sharing homeland security information through the conduct of collecting, analyzing 
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and disseminating threat information based on the number of USIC member 
organizations, HSIE elements, fusion centers, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and private 
sector ISACs. At the federal level, there are 17 members of the USIC; within the USIC 
there are 56 FBI Field Intelligence Groups as elements of the FBI National Security 
Branch; three (3) DHS headquarters elements and six (6) operational component 
intelligence elements that make up the HSIE for a total of (9); at the state and local level 
there are 78 DHS/DOJ recognized fusion centers; and at the private sector level 15 
ISACs. These 175 entities that make up the HSE has received or may receive some form 
of training on the varied intelligence cycle process models from various federal level, 
federally sponsored or academic institutions. 
The number of intelligence cycle process models, as well as the amount of 
intelligence consumers, is as varied as the number of intelligence producing entities. 
Policymakers exist at all levels of government, law enforcement elements operate at all 
levels of government and other public safety officials provide prevention, protection, 
recovery, and response resources at all levels of government. Additionally, the private 
sector, likewise, supports the prevention, protection, recover, and response mission 
spaces that integrates the business community yet another intelligence consumer. 
Because of the post-9/11 HSE, these entities now serve as key partners in the first phase 
of the intelligence cycle – planning and direction. However, a vital question surfaces; 
who is responsible for determining the planning and direction, as well as prioritizing, 
what should be collected in order to ensure appropriate finished intelligence is produced 
and disseminated as an end-result of the intelligence cycle process model?  Can the 
National Network serve as an effective analytic element at the state and local level for 
such an enormous customer base? 
Additionally, with the diverse numbers of intelligence cycle process models and 
the assorted training venues another question remains; is it appropriate to employ the 
intelligence cycle process model in an effort to detect significant national security and 
homeland security threats originating or residing within our nation’s borders provide it 
was not designed and intended to serve as such?  Further, is it possible to evaluate the 
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USIC intelligence cycle process model in the performance of domestic intelligence 
collection activities at the state and local level in support of the HSE?   
A new intelligence cycle process model would provide an opportunity for a more 
cohesive community of stakeholders who could both exploit training and educational 
opportunities to the benefit of the collective whole. 
E. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYING THE INTELLIGENCE 
CYCLE PROCESS MODEL 
Two key challenges to employing the USIC intelligence cycle process model is 
defining the term homeland security intelligence and the lack of access to information 
necessary to provide a comprehensive threat picture. A challenge to adopting a 
standardized intelligence cycle process model within the HSE may be associated with the 
fact the term homeland security intelligence has not been defined or codified in law.182  
The closest definition provided by law is the term homeland security information 
provided in the 2002 Homeland Security Act that states it is; 
any information possessed by a federal, state or local agency that (a) 
related to the threat of terrorist activity, (b) relates to the ability to prevent, 
interdict or disrupt terrorist activity, (c) would improve the identification 
or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization, or (d) 
would improve the response to a terrorist act. 
There are clear challenges associated with effectively employing initial phases of 
the intelligence cycle process model - planning and direction, as well as collection - at the 
state and local level given the independent nature of stakeholders. What element serves as 
the compromising authoritative body for determining planning and direction for the 
National Network and broader HSE?  What element ensures access to information when 
it is incomplete due to information sharing disputes between agencies (whether cultural 
or procedural)?  What element shoulders the responsibility to address the lack of 
standardized training given the various forms of intelligence cycle process models?  As 
argued previously, proper planning and direction, as well as efficient information 
                                                 
182 Mark A. Randol, Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, 
Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, RL33616, January 14, 2009, 9. 
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collection within the HSE, increases the performance of the final intelligence product 
aimed at providing situational awareness and a common threat picture for all 
stakeholders. 
The U.S. counterterrorism strategy and its implementation have seen little 
progress since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The “shared responsibility” proposition has 
not been fully realized in the sharing of intelligence and threat information at all levels of 
government or the “whole of government” approach to counterterrorism investigations. 
This concern directly affects DHS’ ability to share intelligence and threat information 
with state, local, and private sector partners as mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act, 
particularly given that the DHS State and Local Program Office has a mandated role to 
support the National Network as state and local intelligence collection and analytical 
centers.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Within this thesis, the writer identified several critical moments in U.S. history 
that initiated major intelligence reform at the federal level, as well as the state and local 
levels of government. The attack of Pearl Harbor in 1947 and the subsequent involvement 
in World War II, initiated the creation of the USIC per the 1947 National Security Act. In 
1981, President Ronald Reagan issued EO 12333 United States Intelligence Activities in 
order to address domestic intelligence collection abuses by federal level government 
agencies. During the same general period, the “1983-suits” were legal actions brought 
against local police intelligence units in the 1960s and 1970s for violating citizen groups’ 
First Amendment rights. This period facilitated the establishment of IALEA and the 
establishment of 28 CFR Part 23 that provides guidance for criminal intelligence. The 
tragic and horrible attack on the U.S. by international terrorist on September 11, 2001, 
initiated the creation of DHS, and subsequently, the DHS I&A State and Local Program 
Office charged with providing federal level support to the National Network and HSE. 
After 9/11, the IACP endorsed ILP and the Major City Chiefs’ initiated the MCC 
Criminal Intelligence Enterprise.  
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Table 2, constructed by the author, provides a visual snapshot of the gaps in 
synchronizing federal level intelligence initiatives and integration. While the post-9/11 
National Network was not established until 2003, history reveals a pattern of addressing 
domestic intelligence collection issues. Based on the information reflected, one can 
deduce the timeframe gaps between federal level intelligence doctrine and intelligence 
cycle process employment and the establishment of local level intelligence guidance and 
intelligence process endorsement. As an example, there was 24 years from the initiation 
of the first U.S. Army-wide intelligence doctrine to the first documented intelligence 
cycle process model [1920–1944] and 27 years until the creation of the USIC [1920–
1947]. There was 33 years from the creation of the USIC to the establishment of the 
IALEA, formalizing efforts to professionalize law enforcement analysts and the 
establishment of the Regional Information Sharing System operating under 28 CFR Part 
23 [1947–1980]. The IACP, which was established in 1893, did not endorse intelligence-
led policing until 19 years later in 2002, the same period in which DHS was created 
under the 2002 Homeland Security Act. In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act established 
the DHS I&A State and Local Program Office for the specific purpose of providing 
federal level intelligence support to the National Network created in 2003. Establishing 
intelligence training guidance at the state and local level, external to the National 
Network occurred in 2007 with the Major City Chiefs’ establishment of the Major City 
Chiefs’ Criminal Intelligence Enterprise four years later in 2011. The White House 
supported the intelligence progress at the state and local level and issued EO 13470 in 
2008 that amended EO 12333 to include the state and local environment within the U.S. 
Intelligence Activities guidance, as well as establishing EO 13594 two years later in 2010 
that provided guidance for state and local access to national security information. The 
intent of the aforementioned chronology of intelligence initiatives is to provide a visual 
snapshot of the gaps between time in the synchronizing of federal level intelligence 
initiatives and integration of the National Network and the broader HSE. 
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Table 2.   Timeline Reflecting Intelligence Policy Engagement among Federal and 
Local Environment 
 
Date Organization Intelligence Initiative 
1920 U.S. Army U.S. Army-wide intelligence doctrine 
1944 U.S. Army First documented intelligence cycle process 
model 
1947 White House & 
Congress  
Established U.S. Intelligence Community 
1980 International 
Association of Law 
Enforcement 
Analyst 
Professionalize law enforcement analytic 




RISS established and implemented through 
the Criminal Intelligence Operating Policies 
at the federal level - 28 CFR Part 23 
1981 White House Established Executive Order 12333 - U.S. 
Intelligence Activities; provides guidance 




Chiefs’ of Police 
Established in 1893; endorsed intelligence-
led policing 
 
2003 National Network 
of Fusion Centers 
Established state & local intelligence and 
information sharing network 
2007 DHS I&A Establish a DHS State, Local, and Regional 
Fusion Center Initiative necessary for 
establishing partnerships with state, local, 
and regional fusion centers; specifically 
section (b) (11) mandates providing training 
to state, local, and regional fusion centers 
2007 DOJ Global Justice 
Information Sharing 
Initiative  
Published the minimal criminal intelligence 
training standards for law enforcement and 
other criminal justice agencies in the U.S. 
2008 White House Amended EO 12333 via EO 13470 to 
include state & local environment 
2010 White House Established EO 13549; provided state & 
local access to classified national security 
information 




In theory, the intelligence production cycle, otherwise known as the intelligence 
cycle, is the process by which information is acquired and converted into an assessment 
or estimate begins and ends with the policy maker. Ideally, policymakers advise the 
managers of the USIC collection and production organization of their informational 
needs. In practice, it is often up to intelligence managers to gauge and anticipate policy 
maker’s needs because policy makers have never been particularly diligent or effective in 
articulating their informational needs. Yet, today DHS I&A field deployed personnel not 
only provide training on the intelligence cycle process model, but they are also requested 
to manage the intelligence cycle in their area of responsibility to include the sharing of 
threat-related information between SLTPS partners and the federal government. 
Throughout the literature review and case study, the writer offered the intelligence cycle 
process model serves as a theoretical concept allowing academic comprehension by 
nonintelligence individuals. The writer also reasoned, based on the interpretation of 
literature, case study to include professional experience and observation, the practical 
employment of the intelligence cycle process model at the strategic and operational levels 
within the post-9/11 HSE has not fully been studied in order to evaluate its effectiveness 
or appropriateness.    
This document was intended to provide awareness of employing the intelligence 
cycle process model and initiate dialogue regarding standardizing an intelligence cycle 
process within the HSE. The writer acknowledges there are possible challenges with 
attempting to standardize the intelligence cycle process model. The obvious challenges to 
the enormous task of standardizing a domestic intelligence cycle process given the 
numerous and varied stakeholders at the federal, state and local level are identifying who 
would serve as the principle oversight and/executive agency for standardizing such a 
training program. While the DNI is the executive agency for the USIC, additional thought 
would have to be given to integrating the state and local level, as well as the private 
sector. At the state and local level, the National Fusion Center Association represents the 
National Network, and they are in an executive position to provide influence for the 
training requirements. Similarly, the IACP, the MCCIE, and IALEIA serve as influencing 
bodies for elements external to the National Network. The private sector as critical 
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elements of the HSE may prove as the most challenging when integrating key elements 
into discussions of standardizing the intelligence cycle process model.  
Another challenge deals with building consensus among the numerous and varied 
HSE stakeholders regarding the design of an intelligence cycle process model that 
appropriately addresses USIC intelligence requirements and the intelligence information 
needs for nontraditional intelligence elements. In proposing and developing a new 
intelligence cycle process model, considerations must be given to the varying analytic 
and operational paces of the intelligence, law enforcement, and private sector 
environments. The timeframe provided for pure USIC analytic and operational differ 
significantly from the analytic and operational environments of the National Network, the 
great law enforcement and private sector communities. 
In conclusion, drawing on publicly available information from government, 
academia, and national security consortiums, analysis revealed broad acceptance of the 
intelligence cycle process model philosophy. However, literature provided by academic 
and operational practitioners support claims that the intelligence cycle process model is 
flawed and not practical in the operational environment. This thesis may serve as a basis 
for recommending additional research necessary for studying the intelligence cycle 
process model implementation and employment within the HSE and its effectiveness in 
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